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SECOND-BEST CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
WILLIAM ORTMAN* 
ABSTRACT 
Criminal procedure reform can be understood as a “second-best” 
enterprise. The general theory of second best applies where an ingredient 
necessary for a “first-best” ordering is unattainable. That’s an apt 
description of the contemporary criminal process. Our normative ideals of 
criminal justice require fair and frequent trials to judge guilt or innocence, 
but the criminal trial rate has been falling for at least a century; today it is 
vanishingly close to zero. What may be even worse is how we’ve eliminated 
trials—by endowing prosecutors with enough leverage to coerce guilty 
pleas. Excessive prosecutorial leverage is the source of some of criminal 
procedure’s deepest pathologies.  
This Article asks the reader to accept—as a thought experiment—that a 
negligible trial rate is a constraint on criminal procedure reform in the near 
term. From that starting point, the crucial question becomes whether there 
is a less destructive way to ensure a negligible trial rate. There is: 
inefficiency. The road to a more just, humane, and rational criminal process 
could begin with making formal criminal litigation more inefficient. In 
matters of institutional design, the general theory of the second best 
counsels using unseemly practices, like inefficient procedure, to offset fixed 
constraints, like the absence of criminal trials. If the formal process of 
criminal litigation could be made unreasonably expensive for both parties, 
both would want to settle to avoid it. Policymakers would then be free to 
dismantle the tools of prosecutorial leverage—overlapping offenses, 
draconian sentencing laws, punitive pre-trial detention, and more—without 
worrying about increasing the trial rate. The result would not achieve our 
criminal justice ideals—no second-best solution can—but it could be better 
than the status quo. Without more trials, it may be the best we can do. 
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  INTRODUCTION 
We have mourned the criminal trial for a long time. In 1928, Raymond 
Moley wrote in one of the first academic treatments of plea bargaining that 
the criminal trial was “vanishing.”1 In the nine decades since, countless 
writers have echoed Moley’s observation.2 The time has come to consider 
                                                          
1. See generally Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97 (1928). 
2. See Frank O. Bowman, III, American Buffalo: Vanishing Acquittals and the Gradual 
Extinction of the Federal Criminal Trial Lawyer, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 226, 226 (2007) 
(“[The] number and percentage of civil and criminal cases that go to trial are now so small that a cottage 
industry has arisen to study the ‘vanishing trial.’”); see also SUJA THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN 
JURY 2 (2016) (“Despite frequent highlights in media and pop-cultural displays in movies and television, 
juries have come to play almost no role in the American Legal System.”); Marc Galanter, A World 
Without Trials?, 1 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 7–12 (2006); Malcolm M. Feeley, Plea Bargaining and the 
Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. SYS. J. 338, 339 (1982); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea 
Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 9 (1978). See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S 












the possibility that the criminal trial is not dying, but, for practical purposes, 
dead. 
If the criminal trial is dead, the question confronting criminal procedure 
reform becomes this: what’s the best system we can have without trials? The 
economists have a term for this scenario—it is a “second best,” in which 
one of the inputs required for an optimal ordering is unavailable. And they 
have a theory—the general theory of second best—with insights about how 
to design institutions under second-best conditions.3 This paper deploys that 
theory to plot a thought experiment about criminal procedure reform in a 
“post-trial” world.4  
Part I sets out the thought experiment’s premise. Trial rates have been 
declining basically since plea bargaining began ascending. During that same 
period of time, however, nearly every other important feature of criminal 
justice—incarceration rates, crime rates, etc.—moved both up and down. 
From the juxtaposition of these two facts, I draw the tentative hypothesis 
that plea bargaining, once introduced, operates like a one-way ratchet on the 
criminal trial rate. This hypothesis cannot be proven, but the circumstantial 
evidence is strong. If it is right, it implies that a low trial rate is a stable 
feature of our criminal procedure, not some transitory characteristic. That 
has an important, though unhappy, corollary—that criminal procedure 
reforms that would require more trials are not likely to be adopted. I call this 
the “trial constraint.” The paper explores the trial constraint’s implications. 
Part II provides some background on the trial’s vanquisher—plea 
bargaining. It first explains the trial penalty, the mechanism that propels 
plea bargaining.5 Next it examines the scholarly debate about plea 
bargaining.6 Part II concludes by identifying two core objections to status 
quo plea bargaining. Plea bargaining today transpires in the shadow of 
overlapping offenses, draconian sentencing laws, and punitive pre-trial 
detention, facets of our criminal law that add up to enormous prosecutorial 
leverage. The result is a system where defendants are coerced to convict 
themselves,7 and where, in many criminal cases (though not all), uncertainty 
about guilt is irrelevant to punishment.8  
Part III confronts the extant literature on plea bargaining reform. Spurred 
on by a pair of 2012 Supreme Court decisions taking courts deeper into the 
regulation of plea bargaining than they had gone before,9 that literature has 
                                                          
3. See infra Section IV.A. 
4. See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 2173, 2177 (2014) (coining the phrase “post-trial world”).  
5. See infra Section II.A. 
6. See infra Section II.B. 
7. See infra Section II.B.1. 
8. See infra Section II.B.2. 
9. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012). 











flourished in recent years. That’s a good thing. But many prominent 
proposals for fixing plea bargaining would, if implemented, increase the 
trial rate.10 Sometimes that’s the express goal of a proposal, but often it is 
an unstated yet predictable consequence. If the trial constraint described in 
Part I is real, it implies that reforms that would increase the trial rate are less 
likely to be adopted than they should be on their merits.11  
Taken together, Parts I, II, and III form a conundrum. We know what is 
wrong with contemporary plea bargaining (Part II) and, in theory, how to 
fix it (Part III). But we do not know how to reform plea bargaining without 
violating the trial constraint (Part I). Part IV turns to the general theory of 
second best for help.  
The general theory of second best, which originated in welfare 
economics, provides that when one “ingredient” required for a first-best 
optimum cannot be realized, it is generally unwise to keep the remaining 
first-best ingredients at the levels they would take in the optimum.12 That 
sounds abstract, but the theory’s implications are profound. When applied 
to questions of institutional design, the theory often recommends practices 
that are unseemly, as a matter of first principles, on the grounds that they 
offset other unseemly practices. In a second-best environment, two wrongs 
sometimes do make a right, or more precisely they make things less wrong.  
The contemporary criminal justice system uses prosecutorial leverage to 
eliminate trials. The general theory of second best invites us to ask whether 
there is a better way to avoid trials. There is, and it is right in front of us.  
In American courts, civil trial rates are about as low as criminal trial 
rates.13 Yet in civil cases (generally speaking), no party is imbued with 
unilateral leverage sufficient to compel settlement. How does civil justice 
pull this off? Seeing a civil case through to judgment is enormously 
expensive. While no one thing compels civil litigants to settle, the desire to 
avoid the high costs of motions practice, discovery, pre-trial hearings, trial, 
and appeal is a key driver.14 The result is a system without many trials and, 
in general, without one-sided leverage.  
Part IV argues that the plea bargaining reforms discussed in Part III could 
be made feasible by “logrolling” them with measures that make formal 
criminal litigation more expensive.15 If criminal trials can be avoided 
because they are too expensive for both sides, then policymakers could 
                                                          
10. See infra Sections III.A–III.C.  
11. This is certainly not to say that existing proposals to reform plea bargaining are bad ideas. Many, 
perhaps all, of the reforms discussed in Part III would make plea bargaining more just, rational, and 
humane. 
12. See infra Section IV.A. 
13. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.  
14. See infra notes 208, 211–212 and accompanying text.  












eliminate prosecutorial leverage while maintaining a low trial rate. And 
while it would be difficult to make the criminal trial itself more expensive, 
inefficiencies could be added on both the front end (with beefed-up motions 
practice and discovery) and the back-end (by liberalizing interlocutory 
appeals). The core idea of the thought experiment is to remake American 
criminal justice in the image of American civil justice, not because 
American civil justice is “first best,” but because it would be better than the 
coercive plea bargaining status quo.  
The civil justice model is not the only possible path to “second-best” 
criminal justice. Part IV also briefly considers a second approach, one more 
analogous to enforcement in administrative law than to civil justice.16 If 
prosecutors could formally determine that a defendant is guilty, then they 
would not need leverage to coerce pleas. And while such unchecked 
prosecutorial power would (obviously) be problematic, it’s plausible that 
even an administrative enforcement-style second best would, in many cases, 
be superior to the status quo.17  
 
*    *    *    *    *     *    *    *    *    *     *    *    *    *    * 
 
In the end, this paper offers a thought experiment built from the premise 
that a negligible trial rate is a fixed feature of our criminal justice system. It 
then explores how we might improve our criminal process while working 
within this basic constraint. Lest there by any misunderstanding, I 
acknowledge that the reform packages this paper describes will not be 
attractive to reformers in the real world of criminal justice. They are not 
really meant to be. So what is their point?  
The visions of criminal adjudication this paper sketches are—judged 
from first principles—unattractive. Yet, I will argue, they are the best 
systems possible if we are stuck with the trial constraint, and they are at 
least plausibly better than the status quo. If this is correct, either a 
pessimistic or a constructive interpretation is possible. That a rotten second 
best could be better than the status quo reflects very poorly on the status 
quo, and offers (yet another) avenue for criticizing it. That is the pessimistic 
reading.  
The second-best models lay bare the shortcomings of any criminal justice 
reform that conforms to the trial constraint. If the models are normatively 
unacceptable—and I believe they are—the implication is that the way to get 
to an acceptable criminal justice system is by shedding the trial constraint 
                                                          
16. See infra Section IV.C. 
17. See infra Section IV.C.1. Even if the administrative enforcement approach is better than the 
status quo, however, it falters in a head-to-head comparison with the civil justice approach. See infra 
Section IV.C.2. 











itself. Fortunately, the trial constraint stems from politics, not some natural 
order. The thought experiment’s constructive reading—and its ultimate 
ambition—lies in the hope that understanding the limitations of second-best 
criminal justice will help ease the path towards resuscitating the criminal 
trial. 
I. THE TRIAL CONSTRAINT  
For as long as we have the data to know, plea bargaining has relentlessly 
chipped away at the criminal trial rate. After developing sub-rosa in the 
second half of the nineteenth century,18 plea bargaining was “discovered” 
by criminal justice commissions and scholars in the 1920s.19 In 1928, 
Raymond Moley examined the guilty plea rate in twenty-four urban 
jurisdictions.20 He found that guilty pleas accounted for between 33% and 
95% of criminal convictions, with seventeen jurisdictions registering guilty 
plea rates between 70% and 90%.21 From that starting point, guilty pleas 
continued to rise (and trials to vanish) over most of the twentieth century.22 
Albert Alschuler reported federal guilty plea rates of 77% in 1936, 80% in 
1938, and 86% in 1940.23 Though the federal trial rate ticked up briefly 
during the middle of the twentieth century, it reverted to its usual direction 
by the early 1980s.24 In the closing decades of the twentieth century, the 
trial rate inched ever downwards, with trials accounting for about 14% of 
convictions in 1990, and 5% in 2000.25 We lack similarly definitive statistics 
for the state courts but the same basic trends appear there as well.26 
                                                          
18. See William Ortman, Probable Cause Revisited, 68 STAN. L. REV. 511, 552–53 (2016) 
(collecting sources). 
19. See FISHER, supra note 2, at 6–7.  
20. Moley, supra note 1, at 105.  
21. Id. 
22. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1064 (2013) (“Guilty plea rates have been rising, more or less steadily, since 
the Civil War or earlier . . . .”). 
23. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33 (1979). 
24. See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 89 (2005). 
25. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture, Loyola 
University School of Law: So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV. 1405, 1414 (2002). 
26. See Galanter, supra note 2, at 9 (“[Available data on state courts] provides a picture of trends 
in the state courts that, overall, bear an unmistakable resemblance to trends in federal courts.”); see also 
T. Ward Frampton, Comment, The Uneven Bulwark: How (and Why) Criminal Jury Trial Rates Vary 
by State, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 183, 191 n.48 (2012) (collecting sources). These aggregate figures mask 
variation between jurisdictions, id., and between offenses. See generally Kyle Graham, Crime, Widgets, 
and Plea Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge Content, Pleas, and Trials, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1573 












Criminal trials continued to disappear over the last decade, as criminal 
justice took a turn towards reform.27 According to data from the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, trials accounted for 3.1% of 
federal convictions in 2008, 2.5% in 2012, and 2.4% in 2016.28 Again we 
lack precise measures for the states, but it is revealing that the three states 
that decreased their imprisonment rates the most between 2006 and 2014—
California, Hawaii, and New Jersey—each had lower felony trial rates in 
2014 than the three states that raised their imprisonment rates the most—
West Virginia, Nebraska, and Arkansas.29 Though there are surely 
complicated stories to be told about the trial and imprisonment rates in each 
state, it seems that recent criminal justice reform has not meant more trials.30  
Meanwhile, much else about the criminal justice system moved 
cyclically. Since the 1920s (when extensive data on trial rates begins), 
criminal justice has moved through periods of punitiveness and periods of 
reform.31 Incarceration has gone up, and, very recently, it has started to 
                                                          
27. On the reform turn in criminal justice in the last decade, see generally Barack Obama, The 
President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 814 (2017) (“Thanks 
to the dedicated efforts of so many in my Administration, the bipartisan push for reform from federal, 
state, and local officials, and the work of so many committed citizens outside government, America has 
made important strides.”). See also sources cited infra note 30. But see Lynn Adelman, Criminal Justice 
Reform: The Present Moment, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 181, 183 (2015). 
28. See U.S. District Courts—Criminal Defendants Disposed of, by Type of Disposition and 
Major Offense (Excluding Transfers), During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2008, 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_impo 
rt_dir/D04Dec08.pdf; U.S. District Courts—Criminal Defendants Disposed of, by Type of Disposition 
and Major Offenses, During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2012, STATISTICAL TABLES 
FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-4/statistical-tables-federal-ju 
diciary/2012/12/31; U.S. District Courts—Criminal Defendants Disposed of, by Type of Disposition and 
Offense, During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2016, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/stfj_d4_1231.2016.pdf. 
29. For changes to state imprisonment rates from 2006 to 2014, see LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & 
JAMES CULLEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, UPDATE: CHANGES IN STATE IMPRISONMENT (2016), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/UpdateChangesinStateImprisonment.pdf. 
Trial rate information comes from the National Center for State Courts. Criminal Caseloads – Trial 
Courts, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://popup.ncsc.org/CSP/CSP_Intro.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 
2019). The 2014 felony trial rates for the states that decreased prison populations the most were 2.5% in 
California, 4.7% in Hawaii, and 1.6% in New Jersey. The equivalent rates for the states that increased 
their prisoner rates the most were 12.1% for Arkansas, 8% for Nebraska, and 6% for West Virginia. Id. 
30. The decline of trial rates over the last decade is consistent with a rhetoric of criminal justice 
reform that has emphasized spending less on the criminal justice system, not more. See Mary D. Fan, 
Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 634 (2012) 
(arguing that criminal justice reform has been “made possible by the social meaning shift in viewing 
harshness-mitigating measures as cost savings”); see also Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 
66 SMU L. REV. 189, 205 (2013); David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 27, 33 (2011); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Searching for Solutions to the Indigent Defense Crisis 
in the Broader Criminal Justice Reform Agenda, 122 YALE L.J. 2316, 2327 (2013); Ashley T. 
Rubin, The Unintended Consequences of Penal Reform: A Case Study of Penal Transportation in 
Eighteenth-Century London, 46 L. & SOC’Y REV. 815, 845 (2012). 
31. See Bryant S. Green, As the Pendulum Swings: The Reformation of Compassionate Release 
to Accommodate Changing Perceptions of Corrections, 46 U. TOL. L. REV. 123, 146 (2014) 
(“Criminal justice scholars compare the historical shifts in justifications for imposing criminal sentences 











come down.32 Crime itself rose and fell.33 Impervious to these ebbs and 
flows in the broader world of criminal justice, the trial rate continued 
marching towards zero.  
An uncomfortable hypothesis presents itself. Could it be that once plea 
bargaining takes root, declining trial rates become an inexorable feature of 
criminal justice? The hypothesis has a corollary—that whatever reforms 
criminal justice policymakers might be persuaded to try, measures that 
would materially increase the trial rate are not likely to be among them. I 
call this the “trial constraint” on criminal procedure reform.  
The trial constraint is a hypothesis about the behavior of criminal justice 
policymakers. It conjectures that they will not be inclined to adopt reform 
measures that would materially increase the trial rate. The hypothesis cannot 
be proven, and I make no attempt to do so. The circumstantial evidence that 
supports it is about a century of nearly uninterrupted declines in the trial rate 
while much else in the criminal justice system fluctuated. This paper’s 
thought experiment proceeds on the premise that the trial constraint is real, 
at least in the short- and medium-terms.34  
To identify a political constraint on criminal procedure reform is 
emphatically not to endorse the constraint as a matter of normative justice. 
As Part IV explains, a criminal justice system with a negligible trial rate is 
relegated to what the economists call “second best,” but which we might, 
without economic jargon, simply call unjust. But condemning it does not 
make the trial constraint any more or less real.35  
                                                          
to a figurative pendulum that swings between retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment.”). But 
see generally PHILIP GOODMAN, JOSHUA PAGE, & MICHELLE PHELPS, BREAKING THE PENDULUM: THE 
LONG STRUGGLE OVER CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2017). For a history of criminal justice reform movements, 
see generally Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., From “Overcriminalization” to “Smart on Crime”: American 
Criminal Justice Reform—Legacy and Prospects, 7 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 597 (2011).  
32. See EISEN & CULLEN, supra note 29, at 1. 
33. See, e.g., PATRICK SHARKEY, UNEASY PEACE: THE GREAT CRIME DECLINE, THE RENEWAL 
OF CITY LIFE, AND THE NEXT WAR ON VIOLENCE 1–7 (2018); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Mandatory 
Minimums and Popular Punitiveness, 2011 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 23, 24 (2011) (“Although the 
United States experienced a dramatic increase in crime rates in the last half of the twentieth century, 
more recent decades have seen reductions in those rates.”); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, 
Social Welfare and Fairness in Juvenile Crime Regulation, 71 LA. L. REV. 35, 51 (2010) (“Historical 
reviews indicate that crime rates fluctuate over time and that many factors contribute to the variations.”); 
David Cole, As Freedom Advances: The Paradox of Severity in American Criminal Justice, 3 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 455, 462 (2001) (“But as the discussion above illustrates, that account is difficult to square 
with the findings that our incarceration rates have mushroomed while crime rates have fluctuated and 
that they have not stopped climbing even as crime rates have experienced a sustained decline.”). 
34. But see William H. Riker, Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the 
Study of Institutions, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432, 446 (1980) (“[I]n the long run, nearly anything can 
happen in politics.”). 
35. Some readers may wonder whether the recently enacted First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 
115-391, is inconsistent with the trial constraint hypothesis. For the reasons noted in the text, I wish that 
it were. But while the First Step Act is indeed a valuable “first step” in the overhaul of federal criminal 
justice, it seems unlikely that it will have a material impact on the federal criminal trial rate. Although, 












If the trial constraint plausibly exists, then its implications for criminal 
justice reform are worth considering, and that is my task. For the most part, 
I will bracket a related question—why American criminal justice 
policymakers are (apparently) allergic to trials. Answering that question will 
require another paper. Still, because the trial constraint’s origins may bear 
on the remedy, it is worth briefly identifying some possibilities. 
One obvious root cause is that trials are expensive.36 As John Langbein 
notes, “[i]n the two centuries from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth, 
a vast transformation overcame the Anglo-American institution of criminal 
jury trial, rendering it absolutely unworkable as an ordinary dispositive 
procedure.”37 Because the government must supply the prosecutorial, 
judicial, and (often) defense resource for trials,38 policymakers’ revealed 
allergy to trials may be simply about saving money. If so, then perhaps the 
real fixed constraint on criminal procedure reform is not about trials, but 
costs.  
Yet costs may not fully explain the allergy to trials. In every case where 
a defendant enters a guilty plea, the state gets a conviction; it “wins.”39 
Trials, on the other hand, expose the government to losing, and the public 
embarrassment that comes with it. Perhaps policymakers constructed a 
system for processing criminal cases (effectively) without trials in part 
because that ensures that the government (effectively) never loses. James 
Whitman argues that there is a relationship between the comparatively weak 
American state and the harshness of American carceral practices.40 Only a 
strong state, Whitman explains, can show mercy.41 Likewise, perhaps only 
a strong state can permit the prosecution to lose a non-trivial percentage of 
criminal cases. If so, the “harsh procedure” of coercive American plea 
bargaining has a similar source as Whitman’s “harsh punishment.”  
There is obviously much more to be said about these—and other—
explanations for the trial constraint. Yet medical doctors do not postpone 
treating disease until they have a complete understanding of a malady’s 
                                                          
rate, see supra at Part III.A, the First Step Act’s mandatory minimum reforms were incremental and 
modest. See Pub. L. No. 115-391 § 401 (2018) (reducing an existing mandatory minimum of twenty 
years to fifteen years and an existing mandatory life imprisonment to twenty-five). Another piece of 
criminal justice reform introduced during the 115th Congress, The SAFE Justice Act, H.R. 4261, 115th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) did have measures aimed at plea bargaining reform, but it perished in committee.  
36. See, e.g., Feeley, supra note 2, at 350.  
37. Langbein, supra note 2, at 9. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY 
CRIMINAL TRIAL 9 (2005).  
38. See Steven Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 601, 626 (1975). 
39. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 
2471 (2004) (“[Prosecutors] may further their careers by racking up good win-loss records, in which 
every plea bargain counts as a win but trials risk being losses.”). 
40. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE 6 (2003). 
41. Id. at 11–15.  











origin. In the same spirit, I focus on the trial constraint’s consequences for 
reforming criminal procedure, leaving its root causes for another day. 
II. PLEA BARGAINING AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
In order to analyze the trial constraint’s implications for reform, we need 
firm footholds in the existing law and literature. Part II.A provides an 
overview of contemporary plea bargaining. Part II.B then explores the 
scholarly debate about plea bargaining’s virtues and vices.  
A. Plea Bargaining Today 
The Supreme Court and criminal justice scholars agree: plea bargaining 
“is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice 
system.”42 The numbers tell the story. Take the three largest states—
according to data from the National Center for State Courts, in 2015 the 
felony trial rates for California, New York, and Texas were 2.3%, 4.0%, and 
2.1%.43 Trials are even rarer in misdemeanor cases. The 2015 trial rate for 
misdemeanors in Texas was 1.4%; in California it was 0.9%.44 The same 
patterns hold in the federal criminal justice system. In 2016 only 2.8% of 
federal convictions resulted from trials.45 Although defendants sometimes 
plead guilty without an agreement—called an “open plea”—most guilty 
pleas are products of some sort of agreement.46 
Defendants who plead guilty give up valuable rights, as judges explain 
to them daily in colloquies.47 Why do the vast majority of defendants waive 
                                                          
42. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 144 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, 
Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (emphasis in original).  
43. The reported data is available from 2015 Criminal Caseloads – Trial Courts, COURT 
STATISTICS PROJECT, http://popup.ncsc.org/CSP/CSP_Intro.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2019). If 
anything, these percentages overstate the number of trials, as the National Center for State Courts 
instructs jurisdictions to report a case as having been tried if a jury is empaneled or, for bench trials, if 
evidence is received. See State Court Guide to Statistical Reporting, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 38 
(last updated Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/State%20Co 
urt%20Guide%20to%20Statistical%20Reporting%20v%202point1point2.ashx. Thus, if a plea bargain 
is reached during trial, the case is still counted as a trial.  
44. See 2015 Criminal Caseloads – Trial Courts, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://popup.ncs 
c.org/CSP/CSP_Intro.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2019). New York misdemeanor data is not available. 
45. U.S. District Courts—Criminal Defendants Disposed of, by Type of Disposition and Offense, 
During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2016, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/stfj_d4_1231.2016.pdf. 
46. Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
911, 912 n.1, 957 (2006) (“While not all guilty pleas result from plea bargains, most felony guilty pleas 
do.”).  
47. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 78 (2002) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The very premise of the required Rule 11 colloquy is that, 
even if counsel is present, the defendant may not adequately understand the rights set forth in the Rule 












their right to have a judge or jury adjudicate their guilt under the favorable 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard? One explanation is that the vast 
majority of defendants are unambiguously guilty, and waiving a 
preordained trial outcome is not much of a concession. This account has a 
tough time explaining trial rates that approach zero. Trials are, after all, 
unpredictable.48 Even for the unambiguously guilty defendant, a trial means 
some chance of acquittal resulting from a prosecutor’s blunder, a 
sympathetic (i.e., nullifying) jury, or the discovery of a previously unnoticed 
constitutional problem during the investigation of the case.  
The better explanation for a near-zero trial rate is the existence of large 
trial penalties—i.e., large differences between the sentences defendants can 
expect after trials and the sentences they receive after guilty pleas.49 Without 
some trial penalty, plea bargaining would probably not happen in any 
significant numbers.50 As trial penalties rise, guilty pleas become more 
likely. A defendant who faces a fifteen-year mandatory minimum prison 
sentence if he is convicted at trial is likely to accept a plea for time served, 
even if the evidence against him is less than overwhelming. Indeed, he is 
likely to take the plea even if he is, in fact, not guilty.51  
In assessing plea bargaining as a method of criminal adjudication, 
understanding the size of trial penalties is critical. Unfortunately, the true 
size of trial penalties is effectively unobservable.52 Prosecutors and 
defendants negotiate over both the offense of conviction (“charge 
bargaining”), and the sentence (“sentence bargaining”). Charge bargaining 
is invisible to everyone but the participants, making it impervious to 
                                                          
Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1272–73 (2006) (“Numerous states have followed suit [with Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 11], requiring their courts to establish a defendant’s understanding of the rights mentioned in 
Boykin before accepting a guilty plea.”).  
48. Gregory M. Gilchrist, Trial Bargaining, 101 IOWA L. REV. 609, 633 (2016) (“Even in a case 
with a known quantum of evidence, there often remains an unknown, and largely unknowable, set of 
possible trial outcomes.”). 
49. See Russell D. Covey, Plea Bargaining and Price Theory, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 920, 961–
62 (2016) (“The mechanism of inducement is the plea discount/trial penalty. Abolish plea bargaining, 
and the trial penalty necessarily disappears.”). 
50. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1059, 1124 (1976) (“If we are truly committed to a bargaining system that can maintain the current 
level of guilty pleas, we are also committed to a system in which defendants convicted at trial will be 
sentenced more severely than defendants who plead guilty.”). 
51. See generally Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: 
An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2013). 
52. Likewise, strictly speaking, empirical evidence cannot confirm that the difference between 
post-trial and plea bargained sentences represents a “penalty” for going to trial rather than a “discount” 
for pleading guilty. See Ben Grunwald, The Fragile Promise of Open-File Discovery, 49 CONN. L. REV. 
771, 804–05 (2017). That said, in a world where more than 95% of convictions are the result of guilty 
pleas, it seems farfetched to suppose that post-trial sentences provide the appropriate normative baseline. 
See Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering Wound Plea Bargaining 
after Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 673, 702 (2013). 











quantitative research.53 Still, we can get some perspective on the size of trial 
penalties by looking at studies on sentence bargaining. Using data on federal 
sentencing from 2006 to 2008, Andrew Kim found a trial penalty 
(attributable to sentence bargaining) of 64%.54 Nancy King and a team of 
researchers found that the size of trial penalties in five states varied with the 
type of crime and between bench and jury trials, but for most crimes and in 
most states, defendants convicted at trial were more likely to be incarcerated 
and for longer periods.55 For many crimes in King’s study, moreover, post-
trial sentences were multiples of post-plea sentences. In Maryland, for 
example, defendants convicted of heroin distribution at jury trials received 
sentences 350% longer than defendants who pled guilty to heroin 
distribution.56 Other studies suggest that the trial penalty assessments in the 
Kim and King et al. analyses are far too low.57  
Even before we get to charge bargaining, then, trial penalties appear to 
be significant. But the limitations of quantitative research notwithstanding, 
there is every reason to believe that with charge bargaining, trial penalties 
go from significant to overwhelming. Substantive criminal codes at the state 
and federal levels, William Stuntz observed, “are filled with overlapping 
crimes, such that a single criminal incident typically violates a half dozen 
or more prohibitions.”58 The point of overlapping offenses and mandatory 
sentences, Stuntz explained, is to present the prosecutor with “a menu from 
which [she] may order as she wishes.”59 A prosecutor’s discretion to choose 
what charges to file, and what charges to threaten to file, is a principal 
source of her control over criminal adjudication.60 Charging menus typically 
                                                          
53. Andrew Chongseh Kim, Underestimating the Trial Penalty: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Federal Trial Penalty and Critique of the Abrams Study, 84 MISS. L.J. 1195, 1202 n.22 (2015).  
54. Id. at 1254. 
55. Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences after Guilty 
Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 973–75 (2005). 
56. Id. at 973. 
57. See Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions, 90 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1133, 1169 (2013) (finding that trial penalties in two mass exoneration matters were between 400% 
and 1300%); Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea Bargaining 
Reform, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67, 89–90 (2005). 
58. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 507 
(2001). 
59. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 2548, 2549 (2004). 
60. Anne R. Traum, Using Outcomes to Reframe Guilty Plea Adjudication, 66 FLA. L. REV. 823, 
858 (2014) (“The prosecutor has wide latitude to add, reduce, dismiss, or substitute charges during plea-
bargaining with little oversight.”); Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes III: Personnel 
Policies and Conflicts of Interest in Prosecutors’ Offices, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 54 (2012) 
(“Through their charging decisions, choices among case-ending options [including dismissal and plea 
offers], and sentencing recommendations, they often become adjudicators of guilt and punishment, with 
courts simply confirming their underlying decisions.”); Lucian E. Dervan, Bargained Justice: Plea-
Bargaining’s Innocence Problem and the Brady Safety-Value, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 51, 61 (2012) (“The 












include offenses with (relatively) lenient sentences at one end, and offenses 
with severe sentences, often with mandatory minimums, at the other.61 In 
all but the most serious or high-profile cases, the prosecutors’ incentive is 
not to seek the most severe punishment available—an option that would 
require a trial—but to threaten the harsh punishment to procure a guilty plea 
to an offense lower on the menu.62 As John Pfaff explains, a prosecutor who 
threatens a thirty-year mandatory minimum for using a gun in a drug deal 
but promises to “make the gun disappear” in exchange for a guilty plea can 
“terrify most defendants into agreeing.”63 The full trial penalty in the case 
is the difference between the thirty-year mandatory minimum the defendant 
faced after trial and the—presumably much lower—plea bargained sentence 
for unarmed drug dealing.64 This dynamic explains why mandatory 
minimums, though rarely actually imposed, loom large over plea 
bargaining.65 
B. The Debate 
Plea bargaining has spawned a vigorous scholarly debate, which this 
subsection explores. This subsection also develops the claim that two deep 
pathologies blight status quo plea bargaining—it coerces defendants to 
                                                          
criminal statutes with significantly different sentences.”); Stuntz, supra note 59, at 2588 (“But given the 
array of weapons the law provides, prosecutors are often in a position to dictate outcomes, and almost 
always have much more to say about those outcomes than do defense attorneys.”). 
61. See Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 857 (2015) (“Prosecutors benefit from having a menu of broad laws 
with mandatory sentences from which to choose because it gives them greater control over the 
bargaining process and makes it more likely that defendants will cooperate with them to avoid 
the mandatory term.”); see also Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation versus Prosecutorial 
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 971 (2009) (“Even in the majority of states that retain 
indeterminate sentencing, statutory mandatory penalties and menus of overlapping crimes give 
prosecutors the dominant role in setting sentences.”); Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects 
of Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. 
REV. 1935, 1939–40 (2006) (proposing analytical distinction between depth and distance in criminal 
codes). 
62. Stuntz, supra note 59, at 2554. In homicide cases, Stuntz explains,  
prosecutors generally pursue every case they can, which is why the acquittal rate in such cases 
is so much higher than for felonies generally. Cases cannot be dropped out of fear that the 
defendants might win at trial; voters may forgive an acquittal, but they surely won’t forgive 
blowing off a homicide. 
Id. at 2563. 
63. JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO 
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 132 (2017). 
64. See Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100 VA. L. 
REV. 183, 188 (2014) (“While the federal sentencing guidelines fix a comparable discount for 
‘acceptance of responsibility,’ the size of plea discounts in federal as well as state practice is in fact 
effectively unregulated, because no law meaningfully limits prosecutors’ discretion to add or dismiss 
charges depending on a defendant’s willingness to plead guilty.”). 
65. PFAFF, supra note 63, at 132. 











convict themselves,66 and, in some cases, it makes factual, legal, and 
normative uncertainty effectively irrelevant to punishment.67 
1. Plea Bargaining Defended 
Plea-dominated criminal justice has its defenders. The basic defense of 
plea bargaining points to its efficiency.68 Efficiency is sometimes cast in 
moral terms—a defendant who is willing to preserve government resources 
by admitting his crime, on this approach, deserves less punishment than one 
who insists on trial.69 More often efficiency is invoked to argue that plea 
bargaining is welfare-enhancing in the same manner (and for the same 
reasons) as ordinary contracts. Frank Easterbrook explained the welfare-
maximizing benefits of trade in the context of criminal cases thusly: 
The parties save the costs of trials. Defendants presumably prefer the 
lower sentences to the exercise of their trial rights or they would not 
strike the deals. Prosecutors also prefer the agreements; they may put 
the released resources to use in other cases, thus increasing 
deterrence. If defendants and prosecutors (representing society) both 
gain, the process is desirable.70 
                                                          
66. See infra Section II.B.2.a. 
67. See infra Section II.B.2.b. 
68. See Gilchrist, supra note 48, at 645 (“Plea bargaining persists for one reason: efficiency.”); 
Traum, supra note 60, at 860 (“Champions of plea-bargaining view it as an efficient and cost-effective 
system that affords defendants an important choice.”); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The 
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 38 (2002) (“Most discussions of plea bargaining 
begin with the observation that plea bargaining makes the prosecutor more administratively efficient.”); 
John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead 
Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 163 (2014) (“Once thought to be a “necessary evil,” plea bargaining 
is now applauded as an efficient means of disposition.”). Of course, one can believe that plea bargaining 
is efficient without believing that this fact constitutes a defense of plea bargaining. As Darryl Brown 
points out, the efficiency gains from plea bargaining “can perversely increase demand for criminal 
prosecutions, rather than serving as a means to meet demand for enforcement that is driven by crime 
rates.” Brown, supra note 64, at 186 (emphasis omitted).  
69. See James Q. Whitman, Presumption of Innocence or Presumption of Mercy: Weighing Two 
Western Modes of Justice, 94 TEX. L. REV. 933, 957 (2016) (“Indeed, we might believe that a manifestly 
guilty defendant who insists on putting the state to the expense of a trial deserves to pay the ‘trial penalty’ 
that American criminal judges notoriously impose—the harsh sentence, usually the maximum, visited 
on obviously guilty defendants who refuse to submit to a plea bargain.”); Gerard V. Bradley, Plea 
Bargaining and the Criminal Defendant’s Obligation to Plead Guilty, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 65, 71 (1999) 
(“The pleading defendant also acts directly for the benefit of many individuals. In so doing, he further 
evidences a changing character—a change for the better.”); see also Alschuler, supra note 50, at 1083 
n.82 (“Leniency for defendants who plead guilty is sometimes rationalized on the ground that a guilty 
plea manifests . . . a willingness to accept responsibility for one’s conduct, on the ground that a defendant 
deserves consideration for making conviction certain in a doubtful case.”). 













In their oft-cited article on plea bargaining as a form of contract,71 Robert 
Scott and William Stuntz emphasized that plea-bargained justice serves 
both efficiency and autonomy ends.72 Both parties to a criminal case enter 
with entitlements. The defendant is entitled to a trial, and the prosecutor is 
entitled to seek the maximum sentence legally available.73 Sometimes, Scott 
and Stuntz explained, “each party values the other’s entitlement more than 
his own.”74 When that happens, “the conditions exist for an exchange that 
benefits both parties and harms neither.”75 
Scott and Stuntz’s contractual defense of plea bargaining depends on the 
invisible-hand rationality of self-interested negotiation.76 Another 
sophisticated defense of institutionalized plea bargaining depends on the 
guided-hand rationality of prosecutors. Gerard Lynch argues that our 
criminal justice system relies on an “administrative” approach, by which he 
means that for “most defendants the primary adjudication they receive is, in 
fact, an administrative decision by a state functionary, the prosecutor, who 
acts in an inquisitorial mode.”77 A “Martian anthropologist,” Lynch 
postulates, “sent to observe criminal justice” on Earth would have 
“relatively little to say about trials,” but would identify the “substantive 
evaluation of the evidence and assessment of the defendant’s responsibility” 
as being done in the prosecutor’s office.78 Lynch acknowledges that 
prosecutorial adjudication departs from the “idealized model of adversary 
justice described in the textbooks,”79 but stresses that it is nonetheless a 
reasonable mechanism to process criminal cases.80 
                                                          
71. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1969 (1992) 
(identifying Scott and Stuntz as having provided the “best defense in the literature” of “plea bargaining 
based on autonomy and efficiency”).  
72. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 42, at 1913. 
73. Id. at 1914. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Invisible Hand in Legal and Political Theory, 96 VA. 
L. REV. 1417, 1422 (2010) (“The common ground [of invisible hand arguments] is that in every case 
some good arises as an unintended byproduct of decentralized action.”).  
77. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 
2120 (1998). 
78. Id. at 2121, 2123. 
79. Id. at 2121. 
80. Id. at 2121, 2141–42. Maximo Langer agrees in part, arguing that prosecutors sometimes 
adjudicate unilaterally (which he calls the Prosecutorial Adjudication System), but departs from Lynch’s 
normative assessment. See Maximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of 
Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 225–26 (2006).  











2. Plea Bargaining Attacked 
Easterbrook, Scott and Stuntz, and Lynch notwithstanding, attacks on 
plea-fueled criminal justice outpace defenses in the criminal law academy.81 
Many commentators have focused on implementation problems. For 
example, critics point to cognitive biases and heuristics that prevent plea 
bargaining participants (defendants, prosecutors, and defense lawyers) from 
negotiating the sort of deals supposed by the “plea bargain as contract” 
model.82 Many highlight the principal-agent problems stemming from 
underfunded indigent defense.83 No matter how well-intentioned, 
overwhelmed public defenders have strong incentives to plead cases in 
order to move dockets along.84 Principal-agent problems are not limited to 
the defense, moreover. Line prosecutors may have interests not perfectly 
aligned with their politically accountable superiors, and their superiors’ 
interests may not align perfectly with the public they represent.85 
Other critiques of plea bargaining center less on questions of 
implementation than on questions of design. One such criticism, already 
alluded to, is that excessive trial penalties lead innocent defendants to plead 
guilty. As Darryl Brown notes, “[t]here is little debate that pleading guilty 
in spite of one’s innocence can be a rational decision under the right 
conditions, and the rules of plea bargaining aggravate those conditions.”86 
The “innocence problem” is among the most common complaints about plea 
bargaining.87 On one level, this is understandable. No matter that false guilty 
pleas are typically rational, they are deeply unsettling.88 On another level, 
                                                          
81. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 706 (2001) (noting 
the “lackluster support plea bargaining garners and the intense criticism it attracts”). 
82. See generally Bibas, supra note 39.  
83. Id. at 2476 (“In some ways, defense representation is even more variable and vulnerable to 
skewing than is the prosecution. One of the main culprits is funding.”). 
84. Id. at 2477 (“To put it bluntly, appointed or flat-fee defense lawyers can make more money 
with less time and effort by pushing clients to plead.”). 
85. Covey, supra note 49, at 958 (“Prosecutors’ interest in resolving cases do [sic] not neatly 
align with those of the ‘general public,’ and are influenced by a wide variety of factors, including 
political considerations, professional advancement, and the desire to minimize workload.”); see also 
Bibas, supra note 61, at 963 (“Prosecutors are agents who imperfectly serve their principals [the public] 
and other stakeholders [such as victims and defendants].”). 
86. DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW DEMOCRACY AND LAISSEZ 
FAIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW 92 (2016).  
87. See Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
143, 148 (2011) (“The objections that have been leveled against plea bargaining are numerous and 
diverse, but most stem from a common problem: plea bargaining reduces the ability of the criminal 
justice system to avoid convicting the innocent.”); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1117, 1119 (2008) (“Much has been made of an ‘innocence problem’ in plea bargaining.”). 
88. See Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 393 (2012) 
(“The argument against false pleading is based in part on society’s moral obligation to prevent wrongful 
convictions.”); James W. Diehm, Pleading Guilty While Claiming Innocence: Reconsidering the 












assessing plea bargaining is, like all questions of institutional design, a 
comparative endeavor. The question is not whether innocent people plead 
guilty, but whether innocence is necessarily a bigger problem in a criminal 
justice system dominated by pleas than it would be in a criminal justice 
system dominated by trials. While there are good reasons to believe that it 
is, we do not—and cannot—know with certainty.89  
The innocence problem may not provide a firm foundation for preferring 
criminal adjudication by trial to criminal adjudication by plea, but two 
further objections to plea bargaining do. They are explored in the 
subsections below.  
a. Coercing Defendants to Convict Themselves 
Plea bargaining, when conducted under the thumb of hefty trial penalties, 
coerces defendants (innocent and guilty alike) to convict themselves.90 The 
problem is two-fold: coercion and self-conviction. Trial penalties, and thus 
plea bargains, are coercive when maximum penalties are inflated to ensure 
that going to trial will be irrational from the defendant’s perspective.91 The 
defendant who can take a plea for time served or chance a fifteen-year 
sentence after trial lacks a meaningful alternative to pleading guilty, and it 
is hard to imagine (given the prosecutor’s willingness to accept time served) 
that the fifteen-year post-trial sentence on the books serves any purpose 
other than to induce pleas.92 The pressure on the defendant to take the deal 
                                                          
to take the moral and ethical position that they will not in any way be involved in a situation where an 
innocent client pleads guilty.”). Cf. Josh Bowers, The Unusual Man in the Usual Place Response, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 260, 261 (2008) (“No doubt, it would be a moral horror to permit innocent 
defendants to plead guilty in a well-functioning and transparent criminal justice system.”). 
89. See Bowers, supra note 87, at 1159 (“After all, trials are imperfect, particularly for recidivist 
defendants who cannot so easily challenge wrongful charges.”); see also RICHARD L. LIPPKE, THE 
ETHICS OF PLEA BARGAINING 225 (2011) (“There are, in fact, numerous reasons to doubt that adversary 
trials, as they are structured and conducted in the United States, are more reliable mechanisms for 
producing truthful verdicts and sentences than robust plea bargaining.”). 
90. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect System for Convicting the Innocent, 79 ALB. 
L. REV. 919, 928 (2015) (“Plea bargaining induces many innocent defendants to convict themselves.”); 
Donald A. Dripps, Guilt, Innocence, and Due Process of Plea Bargaining Plea Bargaining Regulation: 
The Next Criminal Procedure Frontier Symposium, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1347 (2016) (“From 
that baseline, current law tolerates what seems to be increasingly common: plea offers that are 
functionally coercive.”); Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 762, 766 (2016) (“But because prosecutors do not inevitably desire to maximize punishment, plea 
bargaining becomes a coercive process in which prosecutors use the threat of overly harsh sentences as 
weapons for extracting guilty pleas from defendants.”); Langer, supra note 80, at 250 (“When the 
prosecutor makes her final coercive plea proposal, the prosecutor effectively convicts the defendant of 
a specific charge or charges.”). 
91. Concerns about the coerciveness of plea bargaining are widespread. See Ortman, supra note 
18, at 555–56 (collecting sources). Not all agree. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 311.  
92. See Rachel Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 
1034 (2006) (“[T]hose who do take their case to trial and lose receive longer sentences than even 











is amplified, moreover, if he is incarcerated pending trial.93 As John 
Langbein memorably argued, the coercive logic of plea bargaining is 
different in degree, but not in kind, from the medieval continental practice 
of securing confessions by torture.94 
Of course, governments act coercively in many contexts that most find 
unobjectionable, from taxes to compulsory military service to eminent 
domain. Plea bargaining is different because it uses coercion to compel a 
defendant to do the state’s work for it. That the accused must convict 
himself is a strike against his autonomy distinct from, though amplified by, 
state coercion.95 As Albert Alschuler explains, hinging a “substantial 
portion of a defendant’s punishment on a single tactical decision [to go to 
trial or not]. . . assign[s] to the defendant a responsibility that he cannot 
fairly be required to bear.”96 Langbein makes a similar point in comparing 
the coerciveness of trial to the coerciveness of pleas: “Coercing people to 
stand trial is different from coercing them to waive trial and to bring upon 
themselves sanctions that should only be imposed after impartial 
adjudication.”97 
b. Suppressing Uncertainty 
There is a second deep objection to the plea bargaining status quo. With 
outsized prosecutorial leverage, plea bargaining makes uncertainty about 
whether a defendant is guilty less relevant—and sometimes irrelevant—to 
punishment. That is because in a range of cases, the prosecutor can 
unilaterally set the price of a plea without having to take uncertainties about 
a defendant’s guilt or innocence into account. This objection, which draws 
on a point made by Stuntz,98 is less intuitive than the first and requires more 
explanation.  
                                                          
Congress or the prosecutor might think appropriate, because the longer sentence exists on the books 
largely for bargaining purposes.”).  
93. Several recent empirical studies have found that “pretrial detention causally increases a 
defendant’s chance of conviction, as well as the likely sentence length.” Megan T. Stevenson & Sandra 
G. Mayson, Bail Reform: New Directions for Pretrial Detention and Release, in ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, 
A REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 2 (Erik Luna, ed. 2017); id. at n.5 
(collecting studies).  
94. Langbein, supra note 2, at 12–13. 
95. David Lynch, The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of Two Counties, 19 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 115, 133 (1994) (describing plea bargains as the defendant’s “safe but dehumanizing” option).  
96. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 668 
(1981).  
97. Langbein, supra note 2, at 13 n.24. 
98. Stuntz makes appearances on both sides of the debate. Compare text accompanying this note 
with text accompanying notes 72–75. Indeed, Stuntz was responsible for one of the most influential 
defenses of plea bargaining, Scott & Stuntz, supra note 42, and for one of the most sophisticated 












Stuntz argued that when criminal codes are stacked with overlapping 
offenses, pleas are not negotiated “in the shadow of the law.”99 The point 
can be illustrated graphically with an example borrowed (with some 
modifications) from Stuntz.100 Assume a jurisdiction in which armed 
robbery carries a mandatory ten-year sentence and unarmed robbery a five-
year sentence. Assume further that prosecutors in the jurisdiction believe 
that five years is the appropriate sentence for armed robbery, and that they 





In Figure 1, the horizontal axis represents the probability that the 
government would prevail at an armed robbery trial and the vertical axis 
represents the sentence. Dotted line AB shows expected settlement values 
if plea bargaining outcomes were determined in the shadow of trial 
outcomes. The greater the government’s chances of winning at trial, the 
higher the expected punishment. Because prosecutors have determined that 
five years is the appropriate sentence for armed robbery, however, the 
expected settlement values for our jurisdiction are not shown by AB, but by 
the solid line EF. So long as the government has sufficient evidence to bring 
a charge, we expect a five-year plea deal.101 For any “strength of case” value 
                                                          
reconsider his published views. Id. at 2549 n.4 (“Even so, I think we [Scott & Stuntz] overemphasized 
the role trials play—and hence the role law plays—in plea bargains.”). 
99. Stuntz, supra note 59, at 2550.  
100. Id. at 2551. 
101. Here, my model differs slightly from Stuntz’s. Stuntz assumed that prosecutors only file 
charges when they have at least a 75% chance of winning if the case went to trial. Stuntz justified this 











higher than 50% (point E), both the prosecutor and the defendant prefer a 
five-year sentence to the expected outcome of trial, represented by AB. In 
the terminology of negotiation theory, both sides have a BATNA (best 
alternative to negotiated agreement) worse than settlement, implying 
(setting aside barriers to negotiation) that they will settle.102 
Now assume that the jurisdiction changes the penalty for armed robbery 
from ten years to twenty. Dotted line AC shows the new expected settlement 
values if plea bargaining worked in the shadow of trial outcomes, while 
solid line DF shows the new expected settlement values for our jurisdiction. 
Despite the change in substantive law we still anticipate that all armed 
robbery defendants will receive five-year plea deals. From this, Stuntz 
concluded that for many crimes, the details of substantive law are unlikely 
to affect plea outcomes.  
Stuntz’s point is important, but notice another feature of Figure 1: the 
expected settlement values for our jurisdiction (DF and EF) are horizontal 
lines. That means that so long as the strength of the government’s case gets 
to the threshold starting point (D or E, depending on the maximum 
punishment for armed robbery), the strength of the government’s case 
ceases to be relevant to the plea outcome. If the strength of the government’s 
case does not reach D or E, the government will not file charges, but beyond 
these points, it does not matter.  
Now in plain English. In some criminal cases, the prosecutor is a price 
setter, not a price negotiator.103 And in setting plea prices (unlike when 
negotiating them) the prosecutor does not need to take into account the 
strength of her case.104  
Several caveats are in order. Prosecutors can unilaterally set plea prices 
only when substantive law supplies large punishment differentials between 
available charges, and even then, only when prosecutors believe that the 
lesser punishment level fits the crime. But is this generally true? (More 
formally, do the Stuntzian conditions accurately describe American 
                                                          
restriction on the theory that “prosecutors in this jurisdiction operate under severe resource constraints.” 
Id. at 2552. The restriction, however, is unnecessary. There are many ways in which a prosecutor might 
deal with resource constraints, and it is far from inevitable that dismissing robbery cases in which the 
prosecutor could easily extract a plea would be a preferred strategy. I assume instead that prosecutors 
will only bring cases in which they can secure a plea to their preferred sentence. Thus, if the strength of 
the government’s case would entail a settlement in the AE range, my assumption is that prosecutors 
would decline to charge.  
102. See FISHER, supra note 2, at 102; Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to Guilty: Plea 
Bargaining as Negotiation Notes, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 121–22 (1997). 
103. Anne R. Traum, Fairly Pricing Guilty Pleas, 58 HOW. L.J. 437 (2015) (“In the guilty plea 
state, prosecutors set the ‘price’ for plea-bargaining through charging decisions.”). 
104. See Wright, supra note 24, at 93 (“When a defendant faces a possible life sentence after 
conviction at trial and the prosecutor offers to reduce charges, making possible a sentence of only a few 
years, the resulting guilty plea is considered voluntary so long as the defendant says the magic words at 












criminal practice?) Certainly not always. There are two categories of cases 
in which plea prices surely are negotiated between the parties, not set by 
prosecutors unilaterally, and thus where uncertainty does affect prices. The 
first consists of criminal cases with high stakes, where the prosecutor’s 
objective is more likely to be maximizing the sentence.105 In high-stakes 
cases—think homicides and serious white collar offenses—the prosecutor 
is unlikely to believe that the lower level of punishment associated with a 
less serious charge fits the crime. When prosecutors seek to maximize 
sentences, they cannot set the plea price unilaterally, as defendants have no 
reason to voluntarily accept the maximum punishment. Thus, when the 
stakes are high, plea prices must be negotiated in the shadow of probable 
trial outcomes.  
Second, the Stuntzian conditions may not apply (regardless of the stakes) 
when the government’s case is very weak. Consider once more the 
jurisdiction depicted in Figure 1, where the statutory punishment for armed 
robbery is thirty years but prosecutors believe that the appropriate 
punishment is five years. Take the case of a defendant whose probability of 
conviction at trial is only 10%. Perhaps prosecutors filed charges believing 
the odds of conviction were much better, but subsequent developments hurt 
their case. The “expected outcome” of a trial for the defendant is three 
years—thirty years multiplied by the ten percent probability of conviction. 
The prosecutor will be unable to insist on her preferred five-year plea price, 
and will have to give the defendant an extremely favorable plea offer, 
dismiss the case, or (least likely) go to trial. This is the sort of scenario that 
gives rise to the “half a loaf is better than none” sentiment that Alschuler 
found endorsed by an “overwhelming majority of prosecutors.”106 “When 
we have a weak case,” Alschuler reports a prosecutor telling him, “we’ll 
reduce to almost anything rather than lose.”107 
High-stakes and very weak cases aside, there is good reason to believe 
that across a wide range of criminal matters, prosecutors can and do set plea 
prices. As Stuntz explained, “[p]lea bargains do not always, maybe not even 
usually, involve haggling over a surplus as in negotiated settlements in civil 
cases.”108 Gerard Lynch makes a similar point in more vivid language. The 
“rules” in criminal cases, Lynch observes, “are more like those of the 
supermarket than those of the flea market: there is a fixed price tag on the 
case, and you will get no farther ‘bargaining’ with the prosecutor than you 
                                                          
105. See Epps, supra note 90, at 826 (“For example, murder is a particularly reprehensible crime, 
and so prosecutors tend to have strong incentives to enforce homicide laws to their full limits. And for 
this reason, the written law closely matches the law actually applied.”). 
106. Alschuler, supra note 50, at 223.  
107. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 59 
(1968).  
108. Stuntz, supra note 59, at 2554. 











will by making a counteroffer on the price of a can of beans at the 
grocery.”109 And, as we have seen, when a prosecutor has sufficient leverage 
to set the price of a plea, she need not take the strength of her case into 
account.  
The “strength of the government’s case” is the mirror image of 
uncertainty about whether the defendant is guilty or innocent. Such 
uncertainty takes several forms: legal, where there is doubt about how the 
law applies to the facts; factual, for example in cases of mistaken identity; 
or normative, where there is doubt as to whether and to what degree a 
defendant who is factually and legally guilty deserves to be punished. When 
the “Stuntzian conditions” apply, uncertainty about the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence has no effect on the price of pleas.110 An obviously guilty robber 
in the jurisdiction represented by Figure 1 will receive the same level of 
punishment (five years) as a person accused of robbery with a good, but less 
than ironclad, mistaken identity defense, notwithstanding the latter’s 
superior prospects of an acquittal if his case went to trial. 
Thus in a range of cases, plea prices do not take uncertainty into 
account.111 But is that a problem? On one account, it would be useful if plea 
prices never incorporated uncertainty.112 If prosecutors could not give 
favorable plea offers to defendants who might be innocent, those defendants 
would be more likely to take their cases to trial, where some would be 
acquitted. A system in which uncertainty never impacted plea prices would 
                                                          
109. Lynch, supra note 77, at 2130. 
110. At least, not once the probability crosses the prosecutor’s threshold for filing a case. 
Depending on the magnitude of the most severe punishment available, that threshold might be below 
50%. 
111. A recent study by criminologists Shawn Bushway, Allison Redlich, and Robert Norris might 
be seen as evidence against this claim. Shawn D. Bushway, et al., An Explicit Test of Plea Bargaining 
in the Shadow of Trial, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 723 (2014). Bushway et al. asked judges, prosecutors, and 
defense lawyers to evaluate the probability of conviction, the sentence the defendant would receive if 
convicted at trial, and the plea price that they would find acceptable for a robbery scenario. Id. at 733–
35. To test the relationship between the probability of conviction and the expected plea sentences, the 
authors varied both the quantity and quality of evidence against the defendant. They found that for 
prosecutors and defense lawyers (the story was more complicated for judges), as the probability of 
conviction increased, so did the price of a plea. Id. at 739–49. While the study is intriguing and offers 
many insights, it does not disprove the claim that uncertainty about guilt can become irrelevant to plea 
outcomes under contemporary conditions. This is because the scenario did not incorporate tools of 
prosecutorial leverage. The defendant in the scenario was charged with only one crime—first degree 
armed robbery, carrying a maximum penalty of twenty-five years. See Shawn D. Bushway, et. al, 
Supporting Information for “An Explicit Test of Plea Bargaining in the ‘Shadow of the Trial.’” WILEY 
ONLINE LIBR. 9 (2014), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/crim.2014.52.issue‐4/issuetoc. To 
more closely mimic plea bargaining under contemporary conditions, the scenario could have included a 
more serious charge—e.g., attempted murder—that a prosecutor could bring or threaten to induce an 
armed robbery plea at the sentencing level that she preferred. Because the study omitted tools of 
prosecutorial leverage, it cannot reveal whether a “shadow of trial” model fits a plea bargaining regime 
overrun by such leverage.  
112. This is the premise of proposals to fix the size of trial penalties, discussed infra at notes 137–












thus convict fewer innocent defendants than does a system where 
prosecutors can reduce a plea to almost nothing rather than risk acquittal at 
trial. This logic, however, supposes that plea bargaining exists to sort cases 
that can be resolved without trial from those cases that should be tried. And 
perhaps that is how plea bargaining should work. But it is not how plea 
bargaining does work. American plea bargaining is about processing cases 
as quickly as possible, not correctly sorting defendants deserving 
punishment from those who do not.113 If the trial constraint identified in Part 
I is real, that is not going to change. 
To avoid convicting the innocent—or to minimize it, as errors are 
inevitable regardless—would require adjudication. But our criminal justice 
system’s commitment is to minimizing trials, not errors. This is the awful 
reality of “post-trial” criminal justice. In a post-trial world, the relevant 
question is whether the innocent—or the plausibly innocent—should be 
punished less than the unambiguously guilty? My view—that they should—
is based on a decidedly second-best morality. Of course it is “wrong to 
convict the innocent.”114 But conditional on doing that, it is better to punish 
the innocent less. On that logic, the suppression of uncertainty counts as a 
deep pathology of the plea-bargaining status quo. 
III. THE TRIAL CONSTRAINT AND PLEA BARGAINING REFORM 
As noted in Part II, plea bargaining has many critics in the criminal law 
academy.115 It should be no surprise, then, that ideas about how to fix plea 
bargaining have proliferated. Reform has been on the agenda since at least 
the late 1960s, when plea bargaining came under intense scrutiny.116 Early 
reform efforts focused on abolishing plea bargaining,117 or, alternatively, 
streamlining trials to make them cheaper and more accessible.118 The trial 
                                                          
113. Alschuler, supra note 90, at 922–23. 
114. Id. at 922. 
115. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
116. See Alschuler, supra note 107, at 51 (“Most of these observers recognize that the guilty-plea 
system is in need of reform, but the legal profession now seems as united in its defense of plea 
negotiation as it was united in opposition less than a half-century ago.”); see also Ortman, supra note 
18, at 551. 
117. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, Albert Alschuler and Steven Schulhofer each 
argued that plea bargaining should be rejected root and branch. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, 
Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 
U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 937–48 (1983); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 1037 (1984). John Langbein likewise employed comparative analysis to show the feasibility of 
criminal justice without plea bargains. See John H. Langbein, Land without Plea Bargaining: How the 
Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204, 225 (1979).  
118. Proposals to substantially curb plea bargaining by reimagining the criminal trial as shorter 
and less expensive were offered by some of the leading abolitionists. See Alschuler, supra note 117, at 
995–1023; Schulhofer, supra note 117, at 1082–86. More recently, Gregory Gilchrist has argued that 
the proportion of criminal cases resolved by plea could be reduced (and the proportion resolved by trial 











rate’s continued decline in the late twentieth-century confirms that neither 
sort of reform gained any real-world traction.119 Over time, the emphasis 
shifted to smaller, more incremental reform. The pace accelerated when, in 
2012, the Supreme Court issued a pair of decisions confirming that a 
defendant may assert that his counsel’s plea bargaining performance was 
constitutionally ineffective.120 Many observers saw these cases as “game 
changers,”121 and, since 2012, dozens of books and law review articles on 
plea bargaining have generated a large array of reform strategies.122  
The academy’s renewed attention to plea bargaining reform is cause for 
celebration, but an obstacle may be lurking within this growing literature. 
Many prominent proposals to reform plea bargaining would, if 
implemented, likely increase the proportion of criminal cases resolved by 
trial rather than plea. Sometimes increasing the trial rate is the reformer’s 
explicit goal. Often, as we will see, it is the unstated but predictable 
consequence of a proposal. Yet if the trial constraint is real, reforms that 
would increase the trial rate will, at least in the near term, run straight into 
it. That may not make the reforms impossible, but it means that they will be 
more difficult than they should be on their merits. 
This Section shows that scholarship on plea bargaining reform often does 
not account for plea bargaining’s seemingly unidirectional effect on the trial 
rate. The implication is that the aggregate plea bargaining literature (or parts 
of it) may have fallen prey to what Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule call 
the “inside/outside” fallacy.123 The fallacy, which Posner and Vermeule 
believe is common in public law scholarship,  
occurs when the theorist equivocates between the external standpoint 
                                                          
increased), if prosecutors and defendants negotiate over specific trial rights. See Gilchrist, supra note 
48; Gregory M. Gilchrist, Counsel’s Role in Bargaining for Trials Essays, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1979 (2014). 
Along similar lines, John Rappaport explained that “defendants can, and sometimes do, ‘unbundle’ their 
jury trial rights and trade them piecemeal, consenting to streamlined trial procedures to reduce their 
sentencing exposure.” John Rappaport, Unbundling Criminal Trial Rights, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 181 
(2015).  
119. See, e.g., MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, 
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 162 (1978) (“[T]o speak of a plea bargaining-free criminal justice 
system is to operate in a land of fantasy.”). Reflecting in 2013, Alschuler observed that “[t]he time for a 
crusade to prohibit plea bargaining has passed.” Alschuler, supra note 121, at 706. 
120. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).  
121. I. Bennett Capers, The Prosecutor’s Turn, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1277, 1278 (2016). Not 
all observers, however, were so enthused. See Russell D. Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law After Lafler and 
Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 595, 608 (2013) (“In one sense, the Lafler and Frye cases are ‘no big deal.’”); 
Alschuler, supra note 52, at 679 (“These remarks [lauding Lafler and Frye] bring to mind some notable 
words of Justice Holmes: ‘Oh bring in a basin.’”). 
122. A partial list of these pieces can be compiled from the footnotes in this Section. Given the 
volume of reform proposals and my inclination to keep this literature review relatively brief, my 
coverage is illustrative, not exhaustive.  
123. Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 












of an analyst within the constitutional order, such as a political 
scientist, and the internal standpoint of an actor within the system, 
such as a judge . . . . In a typical pattern, the diagnostic sections of a 
paper draw upon the political science literature to offer deeply 
pessimistic accounts of the ambitious, partisan, or self-interested 
motives of relevant actors in the legal system, while the prescriptive 
sections of the paper then turn around and issue an optimistic 
proposal for public-spirited solutions.124 
Posner and Vermuele’s sketch of the inside/outside fallacy fits the 
(aggregate) literature on plea bargaining. At the level of description, the 
literature demonstrates that criminal justice policymakers constructed a 
system of plea bargaining that ensures that only a tiny percentage of 
criminal cases make it to trial.125 But at the level of prescription, the 
literature argues that these same policymakers should adopt measures that 
would produce more trials. Combining the outsider’s perspective for 
description with the insider’s perspective for prescription has helped to 
obscure a fundamental point—the revealed preference of criminal justice 
policymakers to avoid criminal trials.126 
The subsections that follow offer a taxonomy of prominent plea 
bargaining reform proposals that would likely increase trial rates. I divide 
these reforms into three categories: (i) proposals to change the coercive 
background environment of plea bargaining, (ii) proposals to inject 
adjudication into plea bargaining, and (iii) proposals to detect outlier plea 
deals.127 Within each category, we will see proposals that would likely—by 
design or as an incidental consequence—increase the trial rate.  
To be clear, when I argue that a plea-bargaining reform proposal would 
lead to more trials, I am not objecting to the proposal’s normative merits. 
Many—perhaps all—of the reform proposals discussed in this section 
would, if implemented, lead to a fairer, more rational, less punitive, and 
ultimately more just process for adjudicating criminal cases. My protest 
                                                          
124. Id. at 1745. 
125. See supra Section II.B.2. 
126. See supra Part I. My critique applies to the plea bargaining literature as a whole. I do not 
mean to suggest that any of the individual pieces discussed in this Part is necessarily subject to an inside-
outside objection.  
127. The taxonomic exercise is reductionist (like all lumping exercises), but it reveals family 
resemblances between reform proposals that may at first glance seem unrelated. Cf. Bradley C. 
Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting As Antidote to 
Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 479 (2004) (“It is sometimes said that the two most basic 
intellectual moves are ‘lumping’ and ‘splitting’—that is, finding relevant common characteristics that 
allow us intelligently and usefully to group apparently distinct phenomena into a single category 
(‘lumping’), and finding relevant distinguishing characteristics that allow us intelligently and usefully 
to separate otherwise similar phenomena into distinct classes (‘splitting’).”).  











goes only to their prospects in a world where (as I have asked the reader to 













A. Making the Environment Less Coercive 
The first set of reforms seek to change the coercive environment in which 
plea bargaining happens. Reforms targeting coercion include:  
a. Eliminate Overlapping Offenses and Mandatory Sentencing. We 
have already seen the effect of overlapping offenses and draconian 
sentencing laws (including but not limited to mandatory minimums) on plea 
bargaining. These are the driving forces behind large trial penalties, which 
are in turn the driving forces behind the deep pathologies of status quo plea 
bargaining.128 Many in the criminal law academy have argued that 
narrowing overlapping offenses and repealing draconian sentencing laws 
are crucial, even necessary, steps in making plea bargaining a responsible 
way of doing criminal adjudication.129 They get no quarrel here.130  
But such proposals come with a complication. Precisely because 
overlapping offenses and severe post-trial sentencing laws are the principal 
source of prosecutorial leverage in plea bargaining, eliminating them ceteris 
paribus would lead to more—perhaps many more—trials. Overlapping 
offenses and draconian sentencing ensure that a guilty plea will (almost) 
always be the dominant option for defendants.131 Take out these features of 
the substantive law and criminal adjudication would return to regular order, 
where going to trial is sometimes better than negotiating a plea. An increase 
in the trial rate is thus a predictable consequence of eliminating overlapping 
offenses and repealing draconian sentencing laws.  
b. Bail Reform. Next to overlapping offenses and mandatory 
sentencing, pretrial detention may be the leading source of coercion in plea 
bargaining, particularly in low-level cases involving defendants who cannot 
afford to post bail.132 As Alexandra Natapoff observes, “many arrestees 
                                                          
128. See supra notes 58–65 and accompanying text.  
129. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on Political 
Dynamics and A Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 453, 465 (2009) (proposing reinvigorated 
merger doctrine as a check against overlapping offense); Cynthia Alkon, An Overlooked Key to 
Reversing Mass Incarceration: Reforming the Law to Reduce Prosecutorial Power in Plea Bargaining, 
15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 191, 194 (2015) (“Legislative change alone will not 
reverse mass incarceration, but targeted legislative reform could help to change the overly coercive 
atmosphere of plea bargaining.”); Covey, supra note 49, at 968 (“Undoubtedly, a major source of plea-
market distortion stems from the oversupply of penal leniency that is a product of draconian sentencing 
laws and prosecutorial discretion. Reducing this oversupply is critical to establishing a fairer plea market 
equilibrium.”); Langer, supra note 80, at 287 (“Commentators and policy-makers have made important 
proposals to advance these goals that include clarifying definitions and reducing the number and overlap 
of criminal offenses . . . .”). 
130. See infra Part IV. 
131. In the language of negotiation theory, they ensure that prosecutors and defendants in many 
cases have BATNAs worse than settlement. See supra text accompanying note 102.  
132. See Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 
69 STAN. L. REV. 715 (2017) (“For misdemeanor defendants who are detained pretrial, the worst 
punishment may come before conviction. Conviction generally means getting out of jail; people detained 











plead guilty to petty offenses in exchange for a sentence of time served as a 
way of terminating what might otherwise be a longer period of incarceration 
than the offense carries.”133 Reformers have proposed reducing or even 
eliminating the use of monetary bail as a means of easing the pressure on 
defendants in low-level cases to plead guilty.134  
These reforms get no quarrel from me either. But again, consider their 
likely effect on the trial rate. In a sophisticated empirical study comparing 
case outcomes for detained and released defendants in two large urban 
counties, Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin, and Crystal Yang found evidence for 
the common-sense proposition that defendants released before trial have 
stronger negotiating positions vis-à-vis prosecutors than in-custody 
defendants.135 For many defendants, that likely translates into a better plea 
deal, not a trial. But for some portion of defendants, pretrial release will 
make the difference between having a BATNA better than the prosecutor’s 
plea offer or not. In other (less jargony) words, there are surely in-custody 
defendants in low-level cases currently pleading guilty to avoid prolonged 
pre-trial detention who would, if released, decide to contest the charges. If 
so, bail reform that reduces pre-trial detention entails more trials.136  
c. Trial Penalty Caps. Another proposal to curtail coerciveness is to 
place explicit caps on trial penalties.137 Such caps could take the form of 
“fixed discounts,” where defendants who plead guilty are entitled to a 
specific “discount” off the sentence they would have received after trial, and 
not more.138 Or, as Russell Covey has suggested, a trial penalty cap could 
instead be a “ceiling” on post-trial sentences, where the maximum sentence 
a defendant could receive after trial is based on a fixed multiplier of the 
                                                          
on misdemeanor charges are routinely offered sentences for ‘time served’ or probation in exchange for 
tendering a guilty plea.”); Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future 
Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 236 
(2018) (“We find that pre-trial release significantly decreases the probability of conviction, primarily 
through a decrease in guilty pleas.”). 
133. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1322 (2012). 
134. See Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 93, at 7 (“Reducing reliance on monetary bail is a 
central goal of many pretrial reform advocates.”); JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. 
SHOULD END THE PRACTICE OF USING MONEY FOR BAIL 13 (2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploa 
ds/justicepolicy/documents/bailfail.pdf.  
135. Dobbie et al., supra note 132, at 234. 
136. That does not, of course, mean that it will be impossible, but only that it will be more difficult 
than it should. Indeed, recent bail reform efforts have already begun to show results. See, e.g., Susan N. 
Herman, Getting There: On Strategies for Implementing Criminal Justice Reform, 23 BERKELEY J. 
CRIM. L. 32, 58 (2018); Devin Taseff, Note, The Illinois Bail Reform Act of 2017: Roadmap to Reform, 
or Reform in Name Only?, 38 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 528, 531 (2018). 
137. See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based 
Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1245 n.30 (2008).  
138. Id. In a similar vein, Oren Gazal-Ayal proposes a “partial ban” on plea bargaining, which 
would “restrict sentence concessions to a certain percentage of the post-trial sentence.” Oren Gazal-












most favorable plea offer he had received.139 Covey persuasively argues that 
an enforceable cap on trial penalties would transform plea bargaining, 
making it less coercive and more protective of innocent defendants.140 
But consider what a trial penalty cap would do to trial rates. Covey 
allows that a cap would affect the mix of cases that make it to trial.141 Indeed, 
that is one of its virtues. An enforceable cap prevents prosecutors from 
giving extremely lenient plea offers to defendants in cases where the 
evidence is weak; as a result, the cases more often go to trial, and, some 
portion of the time, innocent defendants are acquitted.142 A modest trial 
penalty cap does more than change the mix of cases, however.143 It would 
also change the overall trial rate.144 The “weak evidence” cases that a trial 
penalty cap would route to trial are cases that are currently not going to trial. 
Unless a trial penalty cap would offset that by dissuading the few defendants 
who are currently opting for trial from doing so—and there is no obvious 
reason why it would—it would likely increase the overall trial rate.  
                                                          
139. Covey, supra note 137, at 1242. Covey argues that a ceiling on trial sentences would be more 
effective than a fixed discount on pleas because discounts are “easily evaded through substitute 
bargaining mechanisms, including charge and fact bargaining, and most fixed-discount proposals 
provide few effective mechanisms to prevent the parties from engaging in alternative bargaining.” Id. at 
1260. Covey’s criticism of fixed discounts is surely correct. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Plea 
Bargaining, in 3 ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, A REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 
88–90 (Erik Luna ed., 2017. But trial sentence ceilings, Covey’s alternative, are just as easily 
circumvented: prosecutors need only condition the making of an offer on its acceptance. Covey 
recognizes this and argues that “prosecutors should not be permitted to make the extension of a plea 
offer contingent on its acceptance.” Covey, supra note 137, at 1273. It is unclear, however, how such a 
principle could be enforced.  
140. Covey, supra note 137, at 1245. 
141. Id. at 1250. 
142. Id. at 1250–51.  
143. The proponents of this reform favor a “modest” cap. See id. at 1242 (“Pursuant to the ceiling, 
no defendant could receive a punishment after trial that exceeded the sentence he could have had as a 
result of a plea offer by more than a modest predetermined amount.”); James Vorenberg, Decent 
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1560–61 (1981) (proposing “relatively 
modest, prescribed sentencing concession of ten or twenty percent of the sentence received for a guilty 
plea”); see also Wright, supra note 24, at 111 (“The trial distortion theory, therefore, promotes guilty 
plea negotiations and sentence practices that offer only modest plea discounts to defendants.”).  
144. To be sure, theoretically there is some fixed trial penalty that would be large enough to ensure 
no overall increase in the trial rate. As Schulhofer notes, with a sufficient explicit trial penalty, “a 
jurisdiction could retain control over its guilty plea rate and preserve its . . . level of resources committed 
to trials.” Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 2004 (1992). 
Schulhofer’s point is true in theory and perhaps was even practical in 1992, when trial rates were around 
10%. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. But what sort of explicit trial penalty would be required 
to preserve current rates? Considering the size of status quo trial penalties, see supra notes 54–57 and 
accompanying text, a “modest” penalty probably would not suffice. 











B. Injecting Adjudication 
As we have seen, many critics, and even some supporters, believe that 
plea bargaining is tantamount to conviction without adjudication.145 A 
second set of reform proposals seek to inject meaningful adjudication into 
the plea process.  
External Review. Some reformers propose to supplement the existing 
plea process with review by a body independent of the prosecutor-defender-
judge workgroup. Laura Appleman’s “plea jury” proposal is illustrative.146 
To infuse adjudication and participatory democracy into a plea bargaining 
regime that lacks it, Appleman would require, as a precondition to any plea, 
that a jury determine: “(1) whether the facts stated fit the alleged crime; (2) 
whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; (3) and whether the proposed 
sentence was appropriate.”147 Appleman explains that this would “inject 
some genuine adjudication into our system of plea bargains, something that 
is badly needed.”148 
Appleman recognizes that running guilty pleas through the gauntlet of 
jury review “might make for slower processing of defendants to jail, prison, 
or probation.”149 But that would not be the plea jury’s only effect on criminal 
case processing; jury review of pleas would also lead to more trials. Unless 
the plea jury merely rubber-stamped deals negotiated by the parties—in 
which case it would not serve the purposes Appleman sets out for it—it 
would, in some cases, find that the facts stated did not fit the alleged crime, 
that the plea was not knowing and voluntary, or that the proposed sentence 
was not appropriate.  
Sometimes, as Appleman suggests, the parties would then return to the 
negotiating table and come back with a new deal that satisfied the jury.150 
In those cases the jury’s rejection of the initial deal would affect only a 
plea’s price. But in some cases—the proportion is unknowable—the plea 
jury’s refusal to accept a negotiated plea would necessitate a trial.151 
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146. Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731 (2010). Additional reforms along these 
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A. Fairfax, Jr., Thinking outside the Jury Box: Deploying the Grand Jury in the Guilty Plea Process, 57 
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Engrafting a plea jury onto the plea process means that some cases that are 
currently resolved by plea would have to be resolved by trials.152  
Hard Screening. In a classic article, Ronald Wright and Marc Miller 
propose a different mechanism for injecting adjudication into criminal 
procedure. Adjudication, they contend, need not come from “external 
reviewers,” such as judges or juries, but can instead take place “within the 
[prosecutor’s] office.”153 They contend that the traditional “alternatives” to 
plea bargaining—abolishing pleas or shortening trials154—miss a viable 
prosecutorial strategy: thorough pre-charge prosecutorial screening 
combined with a firm refusal to negotiate reductions after charges are filed. 
The strategy, which they label “hard screening,” allows prosecutors to 
reduce or eliminate plea “bargaining,” in the sense of deals that are actively 
haggled for between prosecutor and defendant. Through hard screening, 
Wright and Miller argue, prosecutors can avoid the most unpleasant aspects 
of plea bargaining in a cost-effective manner.155 
But what of hard screening’s consequences for trial rates? Because 
prosecutors will have eliminated the weakest cases before filing charges, it 
is likely that more defendants would enter open guilty pleas than in 
jurisdictions without hard screening. If the evidence against the defendant 
is overwhelming, there may be little point to undergoing the ordeal of trial, 
especially if the defendant must pay his own attorneys. But it seems unlikely 
that all defendants who could be persuaded to plead guilty via bargaining 
would accede to an open plea under hard screening. Where prosecutors 
refuse to negotiate reductions after charges are filed, defendants who stand 
a reasonable prospect of acquittal have a powerful incentive to forge ahead 
to trial.  
That hard screening entails more trials is not just a matter of speculation. 
Wright and Miller grounded their analysis in detailed data from the office 
of former New Orleans District Attorney Harry Connick, Sr.156 Immediately 
after Connick took office and implemented hard screening, the number of 
trials in New Orleans exploded. In the final year of Connick’s predecessor’s 
tenure, the district attorney’s office tried 190 cases. By the third year of 
Connick’s term, the number was over one-thousand, and it remained 
“around the same level of up to 1,000 per year” for the next twenty years.157  
                                                          
152. Appleman notes that “[t]he reality of the modern criminal justice system prevents any 
increase in jury trials . . . .” Id. at 761.  
153. Wright & Miller, supra note 68, at 49. 
154. See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text.  
155. Wright & Miller, supra note 68, at 57–58. 
156. Id. at 59. 
157. Id. at 76. Wright and Miller acknowledge that “[t]raditional assumptions about the plea 
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implementing the screening/bargaining tradeoff is hard to predict.” Id. at 59. Wright and Miller show 











C. Detecting Outliers 
A third category of plea bargaining reforms consists of measures meant 
to detect outlier plea bargains produced by bad lawyering, cognitive biases, 
prosecutorial overreach, and more. Perhaps the most prominent of these is 
the proposal of Stephanos Bibas (then a law professor and now a judge on 
the Third Circuit) to combat the “chronic misunderstandings and 
irrationality” in plea bargaining via consumer protection-style regulation.158 
For example, to counteract the pressure that defendants feel to plead guilty, 
Bibas suggests a “cooling-off period for plea bargains authorizing five 
years’ imprisonment or more.”159 Bibas also offers a range of consumer 
protection-style disclosure requirements that would “give defendants fair 
warnings of the sentences they are likely to receive in exchange for their 
pleas.”160 Like consumer protection laws, Bibas’s plea bargaining rules 
would ensure that defendants not hastily enter pleas based on an incomplete 
or faulty understanding of the terms.  
If one’s goal is to construct a more humane, rational, and just plea 
bargaining system, Bibas’s ideas are clearly good ones. Why, then, hasn’t 
consumer protection-style regulation flooded the plea bargaining zone? The 
trial constraint suggests an explanation.  
For all the similarities that Bibas points out between consumers and 
defendants, they differ in the most critical dimension. When a company 
makes a legally-mandated disclosure that persuades a would-be consumer 
not to do business with the company, the would-be consumer walks away. 
The consumer protection law has done its work, and the person is no longer 
a would-be consumer. When a prosecutor or judge makes a legally-
                                                          
that the traditional assumptions about how prosecutors can respond to plea bargaining are misguided. 
Yet two other key players—defendants and judges—must also be considered. As noted in the text, 
defendants in hard screening jurisdictions have more reason than defendants in traditional plea 
bargaining jurisdictions to insist on trial. Still, as Wright and Miller point out, a hard screening regime 
could maintain a negligible trial rate if judges sentence defendants who go to trial much more harshly 
than defendants who plead guilty. Id. at 75–76. But if so, hard screening merely substitutes one form of 
coercive plea bargaining for another. That is, hard screening with judicially imposed trial penalties 
converts plea bargaining from a practice that plays out between prosecutors and defendants behind 
closed into a practice that involves judges and defendants communicating with winks and nods. That is 
how Gerard Lynch interpreted Wright and Miller’s data from New Orleans. Connick’s hard screening 
policy did not actually eliminate plea bargaining in New Orleans, Lynch observed, but rather turned it 
into an “implicit bargain between defendants and judges,” through which “defendants who plead guilty 
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exchange for their waiver of rights.” Gerard E. Lynch, Screening versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What 
Are We Trading Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (2003).  
158. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1152 (2011). 
159. Id. at 1155. 
160. Id. at 1156. For a related reform proposal, see Covey, supra note 49, at 964 (arguing for 












mandated disclosure to a defendant that dissuades the defendant from 
pleading guilty, the defendant is still a criminal defendant. Bibas’s rule has 
done its job, except now, unless the prosecutor or judge can find a way to 
put the broken deal back together, he is a defendant heading for trial. 
Consumer protection-style rules governing plea bargaining would dissuade 
some defendants from pleading guilty and push them to insist on trials. As 
such, the trial constraint implies that policymakers are unlikely to adopt 
them. Is that just? Of course not. It is wretched that maintaining a negligible 
trial rate depends on forcing some half-informed defendants to make hurried 
decisions with only a dim sense of the consequences. But that is the 
pathological structure of our criminal process.  
IV. TOWARDS SECOND-BEST CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
The first three Parts add up to an impasse. Part II described two deep 
objections to status quo plea bargaining—it coerces defendants to convict 
themselves and in many cases (though not all) it renders uncertainty 
irrelevant to punishment. The reform measures described in Part III would 
ameliorate these status quo pathologies. Indeed, because they curtail 
prosecutorial leverage, the proposals discussed in Section III.A—
eliminating overlapping offenses and draconian sentencing, reforming pre-
trial detention, and/or capping trial penalties—might even be necessary 
steps in constructing a reasonable plea bargaining system. Yet the reforms 
described in Part III—especially those targeting prosecutorial leverage—
would likely increase the trial rate. If the trial constraint posited in Part I is 
real, that means that the Part III reforms will be unduly difficult to 
accomplish in the near-term.  
This Part explores a “second best” way out of the impasse. Specifically, 
this Part shows that if we want to make the plea bargaining reforms 
discussed in Part III feasible, we could combine them with reforms that 
would simultaneously make formal criminal litigation inefficient. The logic 
comes from the general theory of second best. Efficient criminal procedure 
would be part of “first best” criminal justice, but if strategic inefficiency 
could make criminal trials undesirable to both sides, then prosecutorial 
leverage could be eliminated without increasing trial rates. The idea is to 
make American criminal justice more like American civil justice, which 
achieves trial rates comparable to the criminal justice system without 
(typically) giving overwhelming leverage to any party.161 The “civil justice” 
model of reform would not lead to a first-best system—few familiar with 
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American civil justice would contend that it deserves such acclaim—but it 
could be less pathological than the status quo.  
Beyond the civil justice model, this Part also briefly considers an 
alternative second-best strategy. If prosecutors were empowered to formally 
determine that a defendant is guilty (perhaps subject to some form of after-
the-fact judicial review), they would not need leverage to coerce pleas. I call 
this the “administrative enforcement” second best, as it bears a loose 
resemblance to enforcement in administrative law. I argue that while the 
administrative enforcement second best is still plausibly better than the 
status quo in many cases, it is inferior to the civil justice model.  
This Part proceeds in three sections. Section IV.A introduces the general 
theory of second best and its application to questions of institutional design. 
Section IV.B identifies and analyzes a second-best model of criminal justice 
based on making formal criminal procedure less efficient. Finally, Section 
IV.C considers, but ultimately rejects, a second best model of criminal 
justice patterned on administrative enforcement.  
A. The General Theory of Second Best 
If the trial constraint is real, and American criminal justice is stuck with 
a negligible trial rate, the logic of second best comes into play. The general 
theory of second best provides that when one of the inputs necessary to a 
Pareto (or “first-best”) optimum is unavailable, it is usually foolish to try to 
get all of the other inputs that the optimum would include.162 As the theory’s 
progenitors, economists Lipsey and Lancaster, explain more formally, 
“[g]iven that one of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled, 
then an optimum situation can be achieved only by departing from all the 
other Paretian conditions.”163 The theory has important implications for 
institutional reform. When the ingredients necessary for an optimal 
institutional ordering are attainable, reformers ought to focus on attaining 
them. But when one of them becomes unavailable, reformers should refrain 
from chasing the rest.  
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Though developed in welfare economics, the theory of the second best 
“generalizes easily” to matters of law, policy, and institutional design.164 In 
these domains, the theory often implies that a social policy (or law, 
institution, etc.) that is undesirable on first principles might be usefully 
checked by a second policy that is also, on first principles, undesirable.165 
This is because the relationship between policies is interactive rather than 
additive.166 For example, Jon Elster, drawing on Tocqueville, notes that 
ancien régime France had three governance features that were, at first 
glance, objectionable: (i) “the royal administration had wide, ill-defined, 
and arbitrary powers,” (ii) “venality of office made bureaucracy 
impossible,” and (iii) the “obstruction of . . . highly politicized courts . . . 
made it difficult to pursue consistent policies.”167 Yet, Elster observes, one 
could argue—and Tocqueville did—that in light of the first feature, the 
others were useful checks on monarchial abuse.168 
Bruce Coram has explained that applying the theory of second best to 
questions of institutional design involves a difficulty that applying it to 
economic questions usually does not: “choosing an appropriate standard for 
the first best.”169 That is, unlike in economics, where maximizing welfare is 
the agreed-upon goal, the designers of social and political institutions lack 
a shared objective. This requires a “flexible” application of the theory, 
Coram explains: “The most natural application of the first best in cases of 
non-market institutions would be to use it to refer to the set of rules being 
used for the model of the best arrangement.”170 The first best, a “simplified 
model of mechanisms and outcomes that has been constructed under certain 
assumptions about information or preference revelation,” can then be used 
in the “general sense of an ideal, or benchmark, or unit of comparison, that 
has to be specified for each case.”171  
To apply the theory of second best to criminal justice, we must specify 
what “first-best” criminal adjudication would look like. Of course, there are 
no a priori optima here. The ideal method for adjudicating criminal cases 
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might, for instance, be inquisitorial.172 But consistent with the adversarial 
ideal long thought to be central to American criminal justice,173 I proceed 
conservatively (in the Burkean sense) on the assumption that “optimal” 
American criminal justice is what Gerard Lynch calls the “idealized model 
of adversary justice described in the textbooks.”174 Just how do the 
textbooks describe adversary criminal justice? One popular high school 
civics textbook identifies the “Steps of Justice”: arrest, interrogation, grand 
jury proceeding, trial, punishment, and appeal.175 Or consider this from a 
college American government text:  
The second virtue of the adversary process is that it helps preserve 
the equality of the contending parties in criminal as well as civil 
cases. In criminal cases, because of the adversary process, the 
government is simply one of the contending forces. . . . [T]he routine 
of adversary proceedings do help keep the judge in the middle rather 
than on the side of the government.176 
First-best criminal justice entails abundant, efficient trials that embody due 
process ideals with well-funded counsel on all sides. The textbook model is 
simplistic and artificial, and has likely never existed anywhere or at any 
time.177 Yet, in a meaningful sense, it is what the criminal justice system 
professes to aim towards.  
Of course, the first-best model runs headlong into the trial constraint. 
The robust trials “ingredient” is unattainable, or so I have asked the reader 
to assume for purposes of the thought experiment.178 This is the starting 
point for second-best analysis. It does not, however, imply that our criminal 
justice system can, at present, be characterized as a second best; it may be a 
great deal worse.  
The remainder of Part IV considers the implications of applying second-
best logic applies to plea bargaining reform. The most important implication 
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is that it is an error for a reformer to conclude that just because some 
institutional feature is worthwhile on first principles, it is necessarily 
worthwhile for us. Efficient litigation might seem sensible in principle, and 
it would be in a first-best system. But as we will see, it is not necessarily 
sensible under second-best conditions.179 
B. Second-Best Criminal Justice: The Civil Justice Model 
The objective for a “second-best” criminal procedure is to process cases 
without either (very many) trials or the pathological status quo tools of 
prosecutorial leverage. This Section describes such a second-best 
approach—the civil justice model. The basic idea is simple: adjust criminal 
procedure so that plea bargaining works more like civil settlement.  
1. The Basic Model 
So how can we encourage defendants and prosecutors to resolve criminal 
cases without resorting to coercive prosecutorial leverage? By making the 
formal litigation process inefficient—by filling it with procedural devices 
that add costs—both parties in criminal cases could be dissuaded from 
taking cases to trial. Policymakers could then eliminate the sources of 
prosecutorial leverage without affecting the trial rate. Setting constitutional 
constraints aside (for the moment), there are any number of possible 
mechanisms to increase the cost of formal criminal litigation. Prosecutor’s 
offices could be required to pay a large “tax” to the court (in effect, an intra-
governmental transfer) for cases not resolved by plea. While a defense trial 
tax would likely not create useful incentives,180 the explicit trial penalty—
i.e., the trial penalty fixed by law, rather than by coercive charging and pre-
trial detention—could be calibrated to have the equivalent effect.181 
Alternatively, litigation itself could be bloated (even more than it is) with 
inefficient procedures. And making trials expensive need not be about direct 
costs. Unpredictable trials are also costly to litigants, so this strategy could 
include measures that make it hard to predict trial outcomes.182 
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Defenders, Local Control, and Brown v. Board of Education, 67 MERCER L. REV. 625, 637 (2016) (“80 
percent of defendants are indigent.”). The point of a trial tax would be to disincentive a party from 
demanding trial, not to prohibit trials.  
181. By “explicit” trial penalty, I mean a trial penalty that is set forth expressly in sentencing law. 
For instance, the law might provide that when a defendant is convicted at trial, his sentence is first 
calculated in the same manner as it would have been had he pleaded guilty, and then an additional 30% 
(or whatever number was required to maintain the trial rate) is tacked on as the “trial penalty.” See supra 
notes 137–144 and accompanying text.  
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Obviously, increasing litigation costs in criminal cases is deeply 
unappealing on first principles.183 But in exchange for inflating the cost of 
litigation, reformers could eliminate the sources of prosecutorial leverage 
without violating the trial constraint. If neither side of a criminal case can 
credibly threaten to take a case to trial, overlapping offenses and draconian 
sentencing could be relaxed without worry that the prosecutor’s loss of 
leverage would increase the trial rate. Whatever specific form litigation 
costs might take, the point is to reduce both sides’ BATNAs to the point 
where settlement will almost always be in their interests. The cost of 
litigation, on this approach, serves the function that overlapping offenses 
and mandatory sentencing (and pre-trial detention in low-level cases) do in 
the status quo. In this second-best environment, introducing inefficiencies 
can counterintuitively make the system more efficient.184  
While this approach would not change trial rates, bargaining would look 
different. As we have seen, in status quo plea bargaining, plea outcomes in 
many (though not all) cases are a function of one variable—the prosecutor’s 
preferred level of punishment.185 In these cases, the parties’ relative 
probabilities of victory at trial do not matter. In a criminal justice system 
where the parties are both averse to formal litigation (but in which the 
prosecutor lacks coercive levers), plea outcomes would incorporate the 
parties’ appraisals of the probability that the decision maker would find the 
defendant legally, factually, or (more controversially) normatively 
innocent.186 The approach thus avoids one of the deep pathologies of status 
quo plea bargaining.187  
An example will illustrate. Assume that armed robbery has a statutory 
maximum sentence of twenty years, with no mandatory minimum, such that 
following a conviction, the judge has discretion to impose a sentence 
anywhere from zero to twenty years. Prosecutor (P) and Defendant (D) 
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183. Cf. Irving R. Kaufman, Judicial Reform in the Next Century, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1976) 
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the litigation process simpler and more efficient.”).  
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externalities can be too low.”).  
185. See supra text accompanying notes 99–110. 
186. Normative innocence is more controversial because it implicates the question of jury 
nullification. The parties would be negotiating about the likelihood that a jury would acquit a defendant 
it believed to be factually and legally guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. On the nullification debate, see 
Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1683–84 (2010). 
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government has fairly weak evidence—that do go to trial now and result in acquittals, but would 
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disagree about the probability of conviction at trial. P believes the 
probability of conviction is 90%; D believes it is 70%. The parties agree, 
however, that if D is convicted, the judge will sentence D to between twelve 
and fifteen years. If litigation is costless (no attorney fees, no trial penalty, 
etc.), there is no plausible settlement range. From P’s perspective, the 
expected outcome of trial is a range of between 10.8 and 13.5 years (i.e., the 
90% chance of conviction multiplied by the 12–15 year sentencing range). 
D believes the expected outcome of trial is a range of 8.4 to 10.5 years. P is 
unwilling to offer anything less than 10.8 years and D will be unwilling to 
accept anything higher than 10.5. Both side’s BATNAs are better than a 
negotiated settlement.  
Now impose litigation costs. For D, assume that the law explicitly 
imposes a one-third discount for pleas. For P, assume that costs can be 
imposed equivalent to the utility that P receives from six years of 
imprisonment. The expected “value” of trial for P falls to a range from 4.8 
to 7.5 years. D still expects the outcome of trial to be between 8.4 and 10.5 
years. But D also expects that if he pleads guilty without an agreement, his 
sentence will be in a range from approximately 8 years to approximately 10 
years (the 12–15 year range multiplied by the 33% discount). Now both 
sides are better off negotiating a sentence of between 7.5 (the best P can 
expect to do at trial) and 8 years (the best D can do in an open plea).188 
Litigation costs ensure that both side’s BATNA is worse than negotiating.189 
Making formal litigation undesirable while at the same time enacting the 
sorts of reforms discussed in Part III.A—that is, eliminating overlapping 
offenses and mandatory sentencing (and potentially money bail)—would 
produce a regime that resembles the contractual model of plea bargaining 
imagined by Easterbrook, Scott, and Stuntz.190 It would also resemble 
segments of civil litigation.191 While comparing civil and criminal 
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the trial constraint. 
190. See supra text accompanying notes 70–80. To be sure, making trials undesirable to both sides 
would not solve plea bargaining’s implementation problems. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying 
text (describing critiques of plea bargaining focused on problems of implementation). In particular, the 
principal-agent problems that mar contemporary plea bargaining would remain, especially if indigent 
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settlement rates is a fraught exercise,192 it is noteworthy that civil and 
criminal cases settle at roughly comparable rates.193 Yet civil litigation lacks 
(in many, albeit not all, cases)194 any analogue to the overlapping offenses 
and mandatory sentencing that drive plea bargaining. With no party able to 
deploy extreme leverage, why do so few civil cases make it to trial? Scholars 
offer a range of explanations,195 but civil litigation’s expense plays a leading 
role. To take an extreme example, few will take a contract dispute with 
$50,000 in controversy to judgment if the attorney fees are expected to be 
$60,000.196 The expense compels settlement in lieu of trial. And while 
distributional concerns in civil settlement are important,197 civil plaintiffs 
and defendants negotiate on far more equal terms than do criminal 
prosecutors and defendants.198  
2. Approximating the Model 
But how can formal criminal litigation be made more inefficient, not 
setting aside constitutional constraints? The criminal trial itself is already 
famously slow and costly;199 slowing it down even more seems unlikely. 
Yet there are opportunities to introduce inefficiencies on trial’s front-end—
                                                          
192. One reason comparing civil and criminal settlement rates is fraught is that many civil disputes 
are resolved between the parties prior to litigation. Such disputes do not show up in court statistics at all. 
By contrast, subject to narrow exceptions, criminal matters almost always require some judicial process. 
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193. Russell M. Gold et al., Civilizing Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1607, 1660 (2017). 
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discussed infra notes 228–234 and accompanying text. 
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by introducing civil litigation-style discovery and motions—and its back-
end—by providing more opportunities for interlocutory appeals.  
The pre-trial phase of criminal litigation could be a lot heftier. Unlike in 
civil litigation, where motions to dismiss and summary judgment motions 
are major milestones in a case, pre-trial motions on the merits (as 
distinguished from suppression motions) rarely factor into criminal 
litigation.200 Commentators have proposed giving motions to dismiss a more 
prominent role in criminal litigation,201 creating a new summary judgment 
stage,202 or both.203 As a recent article by Russell Gold, Carissa Byrne 
Hessick, and F. Andrew Hessick proposes, defendants “could move for 
summary judgment, which would require the government to demonstrate 
with evidence that a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant satisfied every element of the crime.”204 This proposal 
sets the standard for a defensive summary judgment motion at the same 
level as a federal motion for judgment of acquittal,205 but a more demanding 
standard is conceivable. The judge, for example, could be instructed to grant 
summary judgment on a defendant’s motion unless the government’s 
evidence would render a conviction “appropriate,” giving the judge more 
leeway to consider normative questions and matters of credibility.206 
Moreover, although the Sixth Amendment precludes prosecutors from 
seeking offensive summary judgment on the ultimate question of whether 
the defendant is guilty, it would not preclude prosecutorial motions for 
summary judgment on a defendant’s affirmative defenses.207 Drafting and 
responding to dispositive motions is time-consuming and expensive. 208 If 
one’s goal is to make criminal litigation more costly, and thereby to 
dissuade trials, expanding pre-trial motions practice makes good sense.  
But if one wished to really boost the cost of pre-trial criminal litigation, 
the discovery process is the place to look. The core tools of civil 
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discovery—interrogatories, requests for the production of documents, and 
depositions—are largely unknown in criminal litigation in most American 
jurisdictions,209 a gap that many observers have urged policymakers to 
close.210 Discovery is, of course, a major source of litigation costs in civil 
litigation.211 Responding to interrogatories and requests for the production 
of documents is burdensome, as is preparing witnesses for depositions.212 
The higher discovery costs go, the more parties want to avoid them by 
settling.213  
While I am certainly not the first to suggest expanding motions practice 
and discovery in criminal litigation, there are important distinctions between 
this proposal and those that have come before. First consider expanded 
motions practice. Prior proposals to create a summary judgment stage in 
criminal cases are premised on the value of judges’ decisions on these 
motions. Thus, Gold and his coauthors argue that the principal virtue of 
dispositive motions in criminal cases is that they would “provide the court 
an opportunity to weigh in on the merits of the case . . . which may help the 
parties’ view of the case converge and thus facilitate settlement,” and 
further, that the “ability to challenge legal theories would also tend to clarify 
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expenses, the proportion of litigation expenses attributable to discovery is typically fairly close to 50 
[percent] . . . . Half estimated that discovery accounted for 25 [percent] to 70 [percent] of litigation 
expenses.”).  
212. See Bronsteen, supra note 208, at 534–35 (explaining high costs of document review, 
producing and responding to interrogatories and requests for production, and depositions in civil cases). 
213. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked For, Getting What We Paid For, and Not 
Liking What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, 1 J. EMP. L. STUD. 943, 950 (2004) (“Discovery leads 
to a decline in trials because it both produces information and requires continued investment.”); AM. 
COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., Final Report on 
the Joint Project of the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and the Institute 
for the Advancement of the American Legal System 9 (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ 
final_report_on_the_joint_project_of_the_actl_task_force_on_discovery_and_the_iaals_1.pdf (“Fewer 
than half of the respondents thought that our discovery system works well and 71% thought that 












the law for future cases, which would facilitate future plea bargaining.”214 
These are important benefits, but note that they accrue only if judges 
actually rule on summary judgment motions. On the other hand, if the 
parties settle before filing these motions in order to avoid an expensive 
litigation process (of which the motions are a part), they are elusive.215 For 
my purposes, it does not matter whether judges actually decide many 
summary judgment motions. Rather, the key benefit of adding a summary 
judgment stage to criminal procedure is that it augments the litigants’ 
incentives to settle.216 
Likewise with discovery. Previous proposals to enhance criminal 
discovery have centered on “level[ing] the investigative playing field.”217 
The asymmetry of information in criminal cases is a major problem, as 
many have observed.218 Given the existing imbalance, if defendants took 
advantage of new discovery tools, that could have a levelling effect. Of 
course, if defendants traded away expanded discovery rights for sentencing 
concessions, the rights would impact the price of pleas but not the symmetry 
of information.219 On the traditional justification for expanded discovery, 
that is a problem. It is not a problem for my purposes, because the additional 
tools in the discovery toolkit would still give the parties more reason to 
settle.  
So far I have considered mechanisms that would make pre-trial criminal 
litigation more like pre-trial civil litigation. In civil litigation, the costs of 
dispositive motions practice and discovery contribute to the near-
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plea discount, open-file could help guilty defendants obtain more lenient sentences simply by giving 
them a valuable bargaining chip to trade away.”). 











elimination of trials. But that may not suffice to maintain a criminal trial 
rate close to zero. Settlement-promoting inefficiencies can also be added by 
creating more opportunities for interlocutory appeals.  
In the federal system and most states, prosecutors are entitled to take an 
interlocutory appeal from an order suppressing material evidence.220 
Perhaps the quickest way to stultify trials would be to liberalize who can 
take an interlocutory appeal and from what orders. This goes beyond 
anything in civil litigation, where the final judgment rule applies,221 but if a 
prosecutor or defendant could halt trial proceedings every time the judge 
makes an ordinary evidentiary ruling with which she disagrees, or whenever 
the judge determines to give a jury instruction contrary to what she has 
proposed, inefficiency would flourish. Indeed, that is why courts ordinarily 
disallow interlocutory appeals. As Justice Frankfurter wrote for the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Cobbledick, the “momentum” of a case 
would be “arrested by permitting separate reviews of the component 
elements in a unified case.”222 “To be effective,” Frankfurter explained, 
“judicial administration must not be leaden-footed.”223 Following 
Frankfurter, if the final judgment rule makes the administration of justice 
“effective,” then liberalizing interlocutory appeals should make the (formal) 
administration of criminal justice ineffective.  
Both on the front and back end of trial, criminal litigation could be made 
significantly more inefficient than it is now. It is worth reiterating that 
inefficiency is not an intrinsic value of the civil justice model of criminal 
justice reform. Its value is instrumental. Making the formal litigation 
process costlier makes it possible for policymakers to dismantle the tools of 
prosecutorial leverage—overlapping offenses, draconian sentencing laws, 
and so on—without increasing the trial rate. While litigation in a first-best 
world would surely be efficient, inefficiency is a second-best response to a 
world in which the trial constraint must be abided.  
There are two further wrinkles to consider. First, the civil justice model 
depends on the existence of criminal defense lawyers who can credibly 
threaten to use the expanded motions, discovery, and interlocutory appeals. 
To succeed, that means, the civil justice model would require adequate 
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funding of indigent defense.224 In a world of underfunded indigent defense, 
that may not be realistic.225 Is that a fatal blow to the civil justice model? 
Not necessarily. If the trial constraint is grounded in minimizing costs, then 
perhaps we should not expect policymakers to adequately fund indigent 
defense.226 But I suggested above that the trial constraint may not be just 
about minimizing costs.227 Rather, it may be that policymakers prefer to 
avoid trials because that means the government never (or rarely) suffers the 
embarrassment of losing. If that is the underlying motivation for the trial 
constraint, then while increasing the trial rate is off the table, adequately 
funding indigent defense is not. In the civil justice model, indigent defense 
could be funded without materially increasing the government’s risk of 
losing.  
The second wrinkle is that defendants, imbued with new opportunities to 
file motions and receive discovery, might be less willing to settle, and thus 
force prosecutors to either try more cases or dismiss valid charges. The logic 
is as follows: Defendants will know that if they refuse to settle, prosecutors 
will face expensive motions and discovery practice (in addition to trial 
costs). Defendants will also know that in many cases—particularly less 
serious cases—it would not be worth the prosecutor’s efforts to incur these 
expenses in order to secure any particular conviction. In law and economics 
terminology, enhanced motions and discovery would mean that more 
criminal cases have “negative expected value” (NEV) to prosecutors. The 
law and economics literature on NEV claims rebuts that logic. Readers not 
interested in a detour through that literature, however, would be well-
advised to skip ahead to Part IV.C now. The main story picks up there.  
An NEV claim exists where the expected value of a judgment is less than 
it would cost the claimant to litigate to judgment.228 Armed with the 
knowledge that his case is NEV for the prosecutor, a defendant in a low-
level criminal case might call the prosecutor’s bluff by insisting on trial. If 
so, the civil justice approach to reform would increase the trial rate and, on 
my own logic, must be rejected. The law and economics literature on NEV 
civil claims shows why this possibility is unrealistic.  
Early law and economics models puzzled over why civil defendants do 
not tell plaintiffs with NEV claims to pound sand.229 More sophisticated 
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models demonstrate that under realistic conditions, plaintiffs with NEV 
claims can extract positive-value settlements from defendants, and that this 
is often welfare-enhancing.230 At least two of the conditions that enable 
plaintiffs to settle NEV claims would be implicated by the civil justice 
model.  
First, “the divisibility of the litigation process can provide a plaintiff with 
a credible threat, and enable it to extract a settlement, even if the plaintiff is 
known by the defendant to have an NEV suit.”231 Civil litigation is 
“divisible” in the sense that defendants do not expend their litigation costs 
in one shot, but rather spread them over the course of a dispute. Criminal 
cases operate in an analogous manner. The criminal defendant’s principal 
analogue to the civil defendant’s litigation costs is the trial penalty. Just as 
civil defendants’ total expenditures rise as they sink deeper into litigation, 
so too can criminal defendants’ trial penalty. The formal plea discount 
works just this way in the federal system. Under the federal sentencing 
guidelines, a defendant who “demonstrates acceptance of responsibility”—
code for pleading guilty—reduces his offense level by two points.232 If he 
accepts responsibility early in the case, “thereby permitting the government 
to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government and the court to 
allocate their resources efficiently,”233 he can receive an additional one point 
off. Criminal defendants’ litigation costs are thus, like civil defendants’ 
litigation costs, divisible.  
Second, repeat players have built-in credibility in asserting NEV claims: 
“If any one of the parties is a repeat player, this party might develop a 
reputation that would might enable it to bind itself to take a different course 
of action than the one that it would be expected to take in the case of one-
shot litigation.”234 Prosecutors are the ultimate repeat players. While it 
might not be worth a prosecutor’s effort to go through with motions practice 
and discovery to obtain any particular low-level conviction, she must 
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maintain a reputation for being willing to do so. And because defendants 
know that, they would be unlikely to call the prosecutor’s “bluff,” even in 
low level cases that the prosecutor would rather not spend the time on.  
C. Alternative Second Best: The Administrative Enforcement Model 
The civil justice model is not the only strategy for achieving a near-zero 
trial rate without using overlapping offenses and draconian sentencing to 
coerce guilty pleas. An alternative second best approach is to minimize the 
defendant’s active participation in the adjudicative process. There are a 
number of ways in principle that this could work. As in the current criminal 
justice system, law enforcement officers could bring their investigations to 
prosecutors for an up or down decision. Today the prosecutor decides 
whether to charge the suspect or decline prosecution.235 Instead, the 
prosecutor’s decision could be whether to convict and sentence. Or it could 
be whether to convict, with the sentencing decision moving to the judge. Or 
the conviction itself could be “reviewable” by a judge, perhaps in the 
deferential manner by which administrative enforcement matters are subject 
to judicial review.236 The precise details are unimportant for present 
purposes. The point is that in principle, a system could be constructed that 
processes cases without trials, but also without requiring defendants to 
actively convict themselves.237  
Most readers will understandably recoil at this approach—which for 
convenience I call the “administrative enforcement” second best. I certainly 
agree that giving prosecutors unilateral control over convictions is 
distasteful. Even so, I argue in Part IV.C.1, the approach would plausibly be 
better than the status quo in many cases, though that says more about the 
pathology of the status quo than anything else.238 In Part IV.C.2, however, 
I show that it lacks something that the civil justice model offers—a long-
run pathway to first-best criminal justice.239  
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1. Comparison to Status Quo 
Why do I say that the administrative enforcement approach could be 
preferable to the status quo? The core point here is that because of their 
outsized leverage in plea bargaining, prosecutors already unilaterally 
adjudicate guilt in many cases.240 The administrative enforcement approach 
would make the prosecutor’s unilateral determination of guilt de jure 
while—and here is its advantage—relieving defendants of the obligation of 
convicting themselves.  
But wait, the reader may be thinking, does this “model” eliminate the 
opportunity for advocacy by defense lawyers? Not entirely. It could, 
however, entail changing the lawyer’s role from adversary to lobbyist. 
Depending on the system’s details, the defense lawyer’s core function in the 
administrative enforcement second best might be to try to persuade the 
prosecutor not to bring charges, or to bring lesser ones. For some 
defendants—especially those who can afford aggressive lawyers—this 
would be a disadvantageous change. Still, the change in role is perhaps not 
as momentous as it appears. In the status quo world of excessive 
prosecutorial leverage, the criminal defense lawyer’s function is sometimes 
already closer to lobbyist than adversary. As Lynch observes, “the defense 
attorney who wishes to have any influence over the inquisitorial process of 
the prosecutor is largely limited to the power of persuasion.”241 
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Even if the administrative enforcement model is less of a departure than 
it might first appear for defense lawyers, there is still the matter of 
prosecutors and police. Wouldn’t they be less careful about screening cases 
in a world in which there was no (or reduced, depending on the details) 
adversarial check on their decisions?242 This is a possible, but not necessary, 
consequence. The administrative enforcement approach would reduce 
“legal” checks on prosecutorial screening. Specifically it would eliminate 
the probable cause charging standard (which applies in most 
jurisdictions)243 and the beyond a reasonable doubt conviction standard 
(which applies in all). Yet in the contemporary plea bargaining regime, 
these legal checks do very little to ensure screening. In a previous paper, I 
argued that the anemic and largely unenforceable probable cause standard 
exacerbates the pathologies of plea bargaining.244 The beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard for convictions, moreover, does little work in a criminal 
justice system that uses prosecutorial leverage to compel pleas before 
trial.245  
The impetus for police and prosecutorial screening in the contemporary 
criminal justice system comes from professional norms and standards as 
much as, if not more than, external regulation.246 As Marc Miller and Ronald 
Wright observed about the New Orleans screening attorneys they studied, 
prosecutors decline “some charges in an effort to interpret the criminal law 
faithfully, even when there is no reason to believe that some other interpreter 
stands ready to overturn the prosecutor’s choice.”247 The administrative 
enforcement approach would abrogate external enforcement that is of 
questionable significance, but it need not annul professional norms 
surrounding police and prosecutorial screening. Indeed, by eliminating the 
fiction that probable cause and beyond a reasonable doubt are back-end 
checks on such screening, it could even strengthen those norms.248  
To be sure, the normative case for the administrative enforcement 
approach over the status quo is not a slam dunk. Prosecutors are not 
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unilateral price-setters in every status quo case, after all.249 In weak cases 
defendants have some negotiating power, which they would lose in the 
administrative enforcement model. Perhaps, as I have suggested, some of 
these weak cases would not have been brought in the first place, but some 
surely would, and those defendants would be worse off than they are now. 
My point, however, is not that the administrative enforcement model is 
Pareto superior to the status quo. It isn’t. My modest aim is to show that the 
model is plausibly better than the status quo in many cases. That the 
comparison is even possible condemns the status quo.  
2. Comparison to the Civil Justice Model 
It is at least plausible that the administrative enforcement model would 
be preferable to the status quo in a range of cases. Why then, did I devote 
the lion’s share of Part IV to the civil justice model? The administrative 
enforcement model has a significant downside when compared to the civil 
justice model. In Part I, I asked the reader to accept the premise that the trial 
constraint is a fact of life in the short and medium runs. I excluded the long 
run from the request. The day may come when policymakers are ready for 
more trials. That prospect makes the civil justice model preferable to the 
administrative enforcement model.  
The civil justice model is premised on injecting costly procedures into 
criminal adjudication to make trials unattractive to both sides. Moving from 
that world to a first-best world—one in which trials are available at least in 
cases where there is a serious question about whether the defendant is 
guilty—becomes a matter of eliminating the costly trial-avoiding 
procedures, which can be done incrementally. So long as that is not 
accompanied by a return of prosecutorial leverage, the likely effect would 
be an increase in the trial rate.  
The administrative enforcement model, on the other hand, is more 
binary. Either defendants play an active part in criminal adjudication or they 
do not. In the administrative enforcement model, they would not, and no 
incremental reform from that baseline could increase trial rates on the 
margins. The administrative enforcement model is thus a one-way door. 
Opening it means closing the door on a first-best criminal justice system, 
not only in the short and medium runs, but in the long run as well.  
CONCLUSION 
                                                          












I have asked the reader to indulge a plausible but unprovable 
assumption—that trials are not vanishing, but vanished—and then to ask 
how best we might conduct criminal adjudication in a post-trial world. I 
conclude by attempting to make the payoffs of this thought experiment 
concrete.  
Part IV identified two models of plea bargaining reform that could 
preserve a low trial rate while shedding the status quo of its reliance on 
excessive prosecutorial leverage. One would harness inefficient procedures 
to make litigation unattractive to both parties. The other would formally 
empower prosecutors to determine guilt. I labored in Part IV to show that 
either model could be better than the status quo. But I made no claim that 
either model would be good enough, much less that it would be just. Let me 
be clear—neither would.  
The second-best models are far from the normative ideals of American 
criminal justice.250 My hope is that the reader finds it disturbing that 
criminal procedure might be better if trials were prohibitively expensive or 
if prosecutors could unilaterally convict defendants. For me, that is grounds 
for despair about the status quo of criminal adjudication.  
But despair is not the thought experiment’s only payoff; there is a more 
constructive angle as well. That the possible second bests are normatively 
inadequate is evidence that the trial constraint stands between us and a just 
system for adjudicating criminal cases. The trial constraint is a function of 
politics, and politics can change.251 A clear-eyed understanding of second-
best criminal justice—including the tradeoffs that it requires—might even 
help.  
                                                          
250. See supra text accompanying notes 174–176. 
251. Cf. William H. Riker, Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of 
Institutions, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432, 446 (1980) (“[I]n the long run, nearly anything can happen in 
politics.”). 
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